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Abstract
While some states can send men to the moon and back, others cannot even muster
the effectiveness to maintain order. Understanding what produces these differences in
the capabilities of states to deliver outcomes to their citizens is central to understanding
why these outcomes differ across states. But what are the fundamental elements of state
capability? This has not yet been investigated; though previous attempts have been made to
understand what the most popular state capability index actually measures, these were made
to determine its validity, not its fundamental elements. I empirically determine that there are
four fundamental elements of a states capability to deliver outcomes for its citizens by using
a rigorous application of factor analysis to four state capability indexes: Outcomes delivered
by a state are represented by the “Effectiveness” by which states are able to implement their
“Political Gumption” (their responsiveness and political resourcefulness to satisfy the demands
of their citizens) in the face of pressures, represented by the “Absence of Internal Pressures”
and “Popular Support and Absence of External Pressures.” These elements represent the
differences in the capabilities of states to deliver outcomes for its citizens, and consequently
at least partially represent the differences in outcomes across states.
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CHAPTER 2
Introduction
A central pursuit of development economics is to understand why outcomes differ across
states. When it is the mandate of states to deliver outcomes for their citizens, understanding
what produces differences in the capabilities of states to deliver these outcomes is paramount
to this endeavor. There exist various notions of why the capabilities of states to deliver
outcomes may differ. Indeed, it seems reasonable that the extent of corruption in the
political system, the degree of impartiality of the legal system, the extent of ethnic tensions
within a country, and the extent of political deadlock, to name a few, each impact the
capability of a state to deliver outcomes for its citizens.
Accordingly, state capability indexes distinguish among and measure many such
notions in order to quantify what appears to explain the differences in the capability of
states to deliver outcomes. But are these notions truly the fundamental elements of state
capability? Or are these notions simply manifestations of more fundamental forces at work?
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Indeed, in order to formulate causal explanations for what determines the capability of a
state, we must empirically resolve the number and identity of the elements of state capability.
This paper empirically determines the fundamental elements of a state’s capability to
deliver outcomes for its citizens. I apply factor analysis, which reveals the forces that drive
the patterns of commonalities of a data set, to four state capability indexes to identify their
fundamental elements. This analysis significantly expands previous attempts to investigate
what is measured by state capability indexes. Indeed, only Thomas (2010), Langbein and
Knack (2010) and Knoll and Zlocyzti (2011) have made such attempts to understand the
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), the most popular state capability index, but to
determine its validity, not to determine its fundamental elements. Further, they improperly
apply theory and factor analysis in order to investigate what is measured by the WGI. In
contrast, I detail a rigorous application of factor analysis as a better procedure to determine
what state capability indexes measure. I then apply this methodology to four state
capability indexes - the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the International Country Risk
Guide, the Bertelsmann’s Stiftung’s Transformation Index, and the Fragile State Index - that
are representative of state capability indexes in general.
Factor analysis reveals there are four fundamental elements of a state’s capability to
deliver outcomes for its citizens. I name these four elements (1) “Effectiveness;” (2)
“Political Gumption;” (3) “Absence of Internal Tensions;” and (4) “Popular Support and
Absence of External Pressures.” “Political Gumption” of a state represents the
responsiveness and political resourcefulness that a government musters to satisfy the
demands of its citizens. The outcomes that are actually delivered to its citizens are
determined by the state’s level of “Effectiveness” to implement its desires. Further, “Absence
of Internal Tensions and “Popular Support and Absence of External Pressures” represent the
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amount of pressure exerted on the state that disrupt its ability to implement its desired level
of outcomes for its citizens. The indicators of the four studied state capability indexes are
manifestations of these fundamental elements.
My analysis reveals the fundamental elements of a state’s capability to deliver
outcomes for its citizens. By distinguishing the truly fundamental elements of state
capability, we can now begin the quest to determine what causally determines each of them
to better understand why outcomes vary so drastically around the world.
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CHAPTER 3
Background
3.1 The Use of State Capability Indicators
Indexes of state capability permit quantitative research concerning the quality of institutions.
But if these indicators do not measure the concepts of governance that they purport to
measure, then economists striving to understand the role of institutions on societal outcomes
could be led widely astray by the meaningless distinctions in state capabilities advocated by
available indices. This hazard bears heavily on those that endeavor to discover truths about
specific institutional dynamics1. Only logical challenges to the validity of these indicators for
1The concern raised by Knoll and Zloczysti (2011) that indicators unable to distinguish among distinct
aspects of governance are inappropriate for allocating aid along those aspects is more trivial (Knoll and
Zloczysti 2011). Consider a fund that rewards developing countries that lower corruption. It is true that a
“Control of Corruption” indicator that really can only measure “Quality of Governance” would allocate more
aid to those with higher quality governance, not necessarily to those with what we think of as better control
of corruption. But if the indicator truly cannot distinguish between our notion of “Quality of Governance”
and our more specific notion of “Control of Corruption,” then the fund would likely be roughly successful at
allocating aid to those that perform along our (artificial?) notion of “Control of Corruption.” In the same
way, analysis of institutional dynamics using this misleading “Control of Corruption” indicator would be
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institutional analysis can assuage this compelling concern.
3.2 Prior Challenges to the Ability of State
Capability Indicators to Measure Distinct
Aspects of Institutions
It is only the most widely used of these indexes, the World Governance Indicators, however,
that has borne challenges to its methodology of evaluating state capability. 2 In a
comprehensive survey, Kaufmann et al. (2007), the authors of the WGIs, detail and
effectively respond to the full range of these critiques, including concerns that the WGIs are
biased, or imprecise, or lack transparency, or are unable to compare governance across
countries or over time, or rely upon improperly weighted or incorrectly modified source data
that possibly exhibit correlated errors (Kaufmann et al. 2007).
But since the WGIs are meant to be proxies for particular aspects of institutional
quality, these questions pale in importance to the fundamental evaluation of the relevance of
the WGIs as proxies. This sentiment has produced three challenges to the appropriateness of
the WGIs as proxies for what they purport to measure, constituting the only such challenges
to state capability indicators in general3.
useful to the extent that it reveals truths about our notion of “Quality of Governance,” though it would be
unable to reveal truths about our (artificial?) notion of “Control of Corruption.”
2This is not to say that all other indexes of state capability were indisputably well-constructed and the
WGI was not, but it is likely that scholars with limited time pursued methodological challenges to the most
popular of these indexes in order to contribute critiques that had bearing on the most analyses possible.
3Since it is impossible to directly verify that an intangible notion is properly measured by an indicator
that attempts to measure it (by the very definition of intangible), these scholars have rightfully resorted to
logic arguments as alternative routes to evaluate these indicators.
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3.2.1 Thomas’ Qualms of Unverified Construct Validity
Concerned that the WGIs are unable to measure what they were constructed to measure,
Thomas (2010) investigates their construct validity. A supposed measure of an unobservable
phenomenon (or “construct”) satisfies construct validity if it aligns with the construct itself.
But since constructs are unobservable, it is impossible to directly compare indicators and
their constructs. For this reason, construct validity analysis requires that a construct be
rooted in a theory that explains how the construct is related to observables, which permits,
via those observables, an indirect comparison of a construct to its purported indicator.
To prove construct validity, an indicator must be defined such that it matches the
definition of the construct that it attempts to measure (“content validity”). Further, the
indicator must be correlated with the variables that are predicted by theory to be correlated
with the construct (“convergent validity”), and not be correlated with the variables that are
predicted by theory to not be correlated with the construct (“divergent validity”) (Thomas
2010). Since the authors of the WGIs do not provide a theory of how governance constructs
are related to observables, Thomas argues that the construct validity of the WGIs cannot be
verified. For this reason, Thomas rejects the validity of the WGIs as measures of what they
claim to measure, contending that they have not yet been proven to actually measure their
corresponding constructs (Thomas 2010).
The logic of construct validity collapses, however, upon consideration of its implication
for data analysis, as Kaufmann et al. (2009) point out. Suppose that we assess the construct
validity of indicators purporting to measure rule of law. Per construct validity analysis, we
must first construct a theory about how this abstract notion of rule of law correlates to
observables. In particular, our theory suggests that rule of law is positively correlated with
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per capita GDP.4 Only those indicators that also positively correlate with per capita GDP
will satisfy convergent validity and be deemed “valid” indicators of rule of law since they
demonstrate construct validity. Subsequent analysis of these “valid” indicators to understand
the relationship between rule of law and per capita GDP however, will obviously verify the
underlying theory used to choose the indicators, regardless of what may actually be the case!5
Construct validity analysis identifies a vexing question: do indicators that are
assembled to measure unobservable concepts actually measure those concepts? After all,
those concepts are unobservable. Its approach, to draw upon theory to get a handle on an
intangible and ensure that it correlates well with the indicators that attempt to measure it,
is internally sound yet invalid for the bias that it imposes upon the indicators that it deems
valid. Another avenue must be taken to scrutinize the measurement claim of state capability
indicators.
3.2.2 Langbein and Knack’s Faulty Tautology Argument
Langbein and Knack (2010) make one such attempt. The authors fear that past analysis of
the WGIs have assumed with misplaced faith that the indicators truly measure distinct
concepts of governance (Langbein and Knack 2010). After all, the authors note, it may very
well be that the subjective assembly of the WGIs, expert as it may be, failed to construct
distinct measures of governance (Langbein and Knack 2010). To investigate this concern, the
authors constructed and tested three competing models relating the WGIs, a measurement
model, a causal model, and a mixed model, to assess the WGIs claim that they constitute
4For simplicity, I am not indicating what rule of law should not be correlated with. This has no bearing
on the validity of my argumentation.
5The above argumentation draws from the logic presented by Kaufmann et al. (2009).
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distinct indicators of governance6.
The authors implicitly argue that an underlying relationship, of any sort, governs a
meaningful set of variables. Empirical exploration of a meaningful set of variables, then,
should reveal that the variables exhibit a particular coherence with one relationship over
others. But since they find that the WGIs are explained equally well by all three models,
Langbein and Knack (2010) argue that the WGIs are incoherent and meaningless (Langbein
and Knack 2010).
Even if we accept the presented (and dubious) premise that variables are void if they
are unable to support one model over another model that holds alternative implications, the
empirical methods of Langbein and Knack (2010) that assessed these models were poorly
constructed. In a remarkably naive manner, Langbein and Knack (2010) rely exclusively on
simple OLS regressions to verify the purported causal relationships between the WGIs of the
causal model (Langbein and Knack 2010). By doing so, Langbein and Knack (2010) unwisely
assume that the regressor of each OLS regression is exogenous to the dependent indicator,
simply because the causal model so stipulates. But it is never logical to assume the
assumption that you are testing. Indeed, their analysis does not rest upon any prevailing
econometric method that assesses causality; their OLS regressions simply validate that there
is indeed correlation between the WGIs. This is why Kaufmann et al. (2010) declare “KLs
[Langbein and Knack (2010)] specification and estimation of their ‘causal model’ is
breathtakingly naive” (Kaufmann et al. 2010).7
6The measurement model advances the hypothesis that the indicators represent the same notion of
governance. All six WGIs, the model purports, stand as different names for the same fundamental concept of
governance. The causal model claims that the WGIs instead represent discrete aspects of governance that
causally determine each other. In particular, the model claims that five of the WGIs, in combination, directly
impact the sixth (Langbein and Knack 2010). The mixed model proposes that two indicators directly impact
the notion of governance, which is measured by the other four indicators (Langbein and Knack 2010).
7It is thus of no consequence to this point that the authors attempted to strength their OLS estimates
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The measurement model presented by Langbein and Knack (2010), at least, was
conducted more appropriately. The authors primarily relied upon a simple application of
exploratory factor analysis, and verification by confirmatory factor analysis, to assess the
claim that the WGIs instead measure the same concept of governance. After all, factor
analysis reveals the latent factors underlying a set of variables. Since variables that are more
closely related will likely be driven by a common latent factor, variables that share one latent
factor are likely to be closely correlated. For this reason, the authors finding that the WGIs
share one latent factor suggests evidence for not only the measurement model but also the
notion that the WGIs are correlated.
As Kaufmann et al. (2010) assert, the steps Langbein and Knack (2010) took to
“validate” their causal and measurement model, therefore, simply revealed the strong
correlation among the WGIs that the authors of the WGIs already acknowledged was present
(Kaufmann et al. 2010). With only this fact in hand, Langbein and Knack (2010) assert the
incoherence of the WGIs, securing the incoherence of their own argument, not that of the
WGIs. Indeed, since Langbein and Knack (2010) have utterly failed to validate competing
models using the WGIs, they cannot possibly demonstrate their incoherence nor argue that
the WGIs are not capable of measuring what they purport to measure. Yet another line of
reasoning is needed to confirm the ability of the WGIs, and other indicators of state
capability, as proxies fit for specific institutional analysis.
3.2.3 Previous Missue of Factor Analysis
Since the indicators of a particular index are constructed to measure related but distinct
aspects of institutions, the number of these indicators should equal the number of related
with fixed effects and account for autocorrelation.
10
but distinct aspects of institutions that are actually measured by the index. Since properly
conducted factor analysis reveals the latent factors that are measured by a data set, it can
be used to assess the validity of state capability indicators to measure what they were
constructed to measure. However, this potential has not yet been realized, for the two papers
that have evaluated state capability indicators using factor analysis relied upon incorrect and
insufficient methodology to produce contradictory results.
Knoll and Zloczysti (2011) performed factor analysis on seven indicators that the
Millenium Challenge Account (MCA) uses to allocate aid to developing nations. The MCA
groups 17 indicators from various sources into three dimensions of governance: Ruling Justly,
Investing in People, and Economic Freedom. Of those indicators, Knoll and Zloczysti (2011)
assert that seven are governance indicators, six measuring “Ruling Justly” and one
measuring “Economic Freedom” (Knoll and Zloczysti 2011). Five of these are WGI
indicators, including the WGI “Voice and Accountability” indicator (WGI VA), and the
remaining two are Freedom House Indicators that are used to construct the WGI VA (Knoll
and Zloczysti 2011). Knoll and Zloczysti (2011) determined that two latent factors are
represented by these seven indicators, and that one latent factor is only measured by the two
Freedom House indicators and the WGI VA (Knoll and Zloczysti 2011).
But results of factor analysis on multiple fundamentally redundant variables can be
very misleading. Factor analysis attempts to expose the latent factors that are measured by
indicators of a data set8. Implicit in this analysis is that commonalities among indicators
reveal common latent factors that drive those indicators to move together. The stronger the
commonality between a group of indicators, the more likely something is responsible for
driving that commonality, and factor analysis assumes that those responsible are latent
8A more thorough understanding of factor analysis is laid out in the Methodology.
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factors. But latent factors are not always what make indicators so similar. Consider five
indicators that loosely measure the same aspect of governance. Factor analysis of these
indicators would correctly reveal that one aspect of governance is measured. Now consider
an additional two indicators, both of which were used to construct one of the previous five
indicators9. Since one indicator is constructed as a combination of the others, it is possible
that these three indicators share a stronger correlation amongst themselves than with the
other four indicators. Noticing this tighter correlation, factor analysis would correctly
suggest that there is something driving these indicators to move together within the broader
common movement of all of the indicators, but would incorrectly suggest that this something
is an additional latent factor. This possibility renders the results of Knoll and Zloczysti
(2011), which analyzes the WGI VA and the two Freedom House indicators that construct it,
invalid10.
There are other problems with the analysis of Knoll and Zloczysti (2011). Knoll and
Zloczysti (2011) posit two criteria for determining the number of latent factors revealed by
factor analysis; the Kaiser criterion and the Jolliffe criterion (Knoll and Zloczysti 2011). The
amount of variation a latent factor is able to explain is represented by the size of its
9This draws a distinction between indicators that noisly attempt to measure the same latent factor and
indicators that are fundamentally redundant because of the way that they are constructed. Factor analysis
on the former is helpful to reveal latent factors, factor analysis on the latter is misleading.
10Though indicators of a particular index are constructed to measure related but distinct concepts, indicators
of multiple indexes make no such claim. Indeed, two indicators, both from different indexes, may attempt to
measure the same aspect of governance. A factor analysis of these two indicators would reveal (correctly)
that they collectively measure one latent factor, but an interpreter uninformed of their similarities would
suggest that the two “distinct” variables are invalid measures of what they attempt to measure since they are
unable to measure two distinct latent factors. Further, the notion of “governance” is quite subjective, and a
particular state capability index relies upon a particular definition of governance to identify what it claims
to be the complete set of related yet distinct aspects of governance. In this way, two indexes measuring
“governance” may misleadingly be attempting to measure two fundamentally different notions. Consider two
indexes that only are able to measure two latent factors apiece, but are based on definitions of governance
so distinct that the four total latent factors are themselves distinct. Factor analysis of these indexes would
suggest that governance indicators are able to measure four distinct aspects of governance, when in reality
they each can only measure two but are attempting to measure fundamentally different concepts.
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corresponding eigenvalue11. Kaiser (1974) suggests retaining factors with eigenvalues greater
than 1, and Jolliffe (2002) suggests retaining factors with eigenvalues greater than 0.7 (Knoll
and Zloczysti 2011). In their factor analysis of the seven indicators for all measured
countries, they find that the first latent factor has eigenvalue of 5.664, the second latent
factor has eigenvalue of 0.796, and third latent fator has eigenvalue of 0.034 (Knoll and
Zloczysti 2011). Thus, the Kaiser criterion determines that the indicators only measure one
latent factor while the Jolliffe criterion determines that the indicators are able to measure
two latent factors. But inexplicably, the authors claim, “As both criteria yield the same
result, a one – factor model is considered appropriate in the all – country sample. This
finding is in line with previous studies, e.g. Langbein and Knack (2010)” (Knoll and
Zloczysti 2011). This is simply false, and their unwillingness to admit a potential departure
from earlier findings is baﬄing. Equally inexplicable is their inability to further explore the
number of measured latent factors using the other, more robust, methods available in the
face of contradictory results1213.
The methodology of Langbein and Knack (2010) isn’t much more compelling.
Langbein and Knack (2010) perform factor analysis on the six WGIs, but only use the Kaiser
criterion to determine that the WGIs are only able to measure one latent factor. Relying
upon only one method to determine the number of latent factors is misguided, however, for
the results of each method are generally by themselves unreliable but when interpreted in
concert are readily understood (Matsunaga 2010). In light of the contradictory (albeit
invalid) finding by Knoll and Zloczysti (2011) that indicators of the WGIs within a set of
11See Methodology section for more information on factor analysis.
12See Methodology for a discussion of these methods.
13The authors also falsely claim that the seven indicators they analyzed were used by the MCA to measure
seven distinct aspects of governance (Knoll and Zloczysti 2011). Rather, the MCA used those seven indicators
as measures of two aspects of governance, “Ruling Justly” and “Economic Freedom.” Their (albeit invalid)
finding that these indicators measure two latent factors thus in no way invalidates the MCA’s classification of
indicators used for aid allocation, as Knoll and Zloczysti (2011) imply.
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indicators are able to measure two dimensions, Langbein and Knack (2010)’s insufficient
methodology is far from convincing and requires robust validation.
The apparent satisfaction of Knoll and Zloczysti (2011) and Langbein and Knack
(2010) with insufficent exploration of the true number of latent factors measured by state
capability indicators exposes a dangerous yet pervasive misconception that these indicators
have already been proven to be invalid measures of distinct institutional aspects. Knoll and
Zloczysti (2011) directly use the findings and reasoning of Langbein and Knack (2010) to
confirm their discovery of one latent factor measured by indicators of the all country sample,
and share the fear of Thomas (2010) that, “potentially weak construct validity would present
a serious defect and a reason for questioning the use of perception-based governance
indicators in aid allocation decisions.” (Knoll and Zloczysti 2011).
Convinced of the validity of Langbein and Knack (2010) and Thomas (2010)’s
challenge to the WGIs, Knoll and Zloczysti (2011) are then easily convinced, without further
analysis of their own, that a conclusion that matches that of these authors is also valid. The
same belief in their own conclusion appeared to have kept Langbein and Knack (2010) from
performing additional tests that may have revealed an interesting and unforeseeable
structure underlying the data set. Indeed, nearly every discussion of these indicators blindly
accepts that state capability indicators have already been validly repudiated by Thomas
(2010) or Langbein and Knack (2010), even though a careful analysis of their arguments as
above firmly rejects such claims. These scholars’ misplaced complacency dampens their
yearning to surmount the naive answers suggested by superficial implementation of factor
analysis, belittling this promising avenue of research to a simple validation of failed logic.
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3.3 A Valid and Robust Approach to Assess State
Capability Indicators
The claim that the WGIs, and other indicators of state capability, measure distinct
components of governance has thus so far remained unchallenged by any robust and valid
argument. It is the attempt of this paper to produce such a challenge.
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CHAPTER 4
Data
Due to their careful and comprehensive construction, the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) is the most commonly used and cited governance index (Arndt and Oman 2006); It
stands on ecletic information; the WGI uses 31 survey sources to synthesize the perceptions
of households, firms, experts, and private information providers (Kaufmann et al. 2011).
Constituting “one of the most important governance indicators,” the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) is also very widely used for its impressive span across countries and
through time; the institutions of 140 countries have been assessed monthly by experts since
1984 (Arndt and Oman 2006). Though the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index
(BTI), on the other extreme, was only established in 2003 as a biannual index, it is
constructed using an extremely thorough procedure that compiles, verifies, and standardizes
expert analysis, quantitative data, and self–collected data1 (Bertlesmann Stiftung 2014a).
1The BTI claims that it is, “the first cross–national comparative index that uses self–collected data to
comprehensively measure the quality of governance during processes of transistion” (Bertlesmann Stiftung
2014a)
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The Fragile State Index (FSI), on the other hand, details state capabilities from a different
perspective by measuring the risks faced by countries. The FSI also uses a significantly
unique assessment procedure; the FSI synthesizes information from millions of articles to
identify risks (The Fund for Peace 2014c).
These prominent state capability indexes vary widely across time, content, and
construction. Assessment of these indexes thus permits a broad understanding of the
abilities and limitations of state capability indexes that has been unattainable by all prior
critiques of the validity of these indexes, which have just examined the WGI.
4.1 The Worldwide Governance Indicators
The Worldwide Governance Indicators, the most widely used state capability index and
produced by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, detail the state of
governance of 215 economies annually since 1996 (Helliwell 2014). In particular, the WGI is
an attempt to evaluate the six distinct aspects of governance that the authors have
delineated from their definition of governance2.
Believing that perceptions provide the most practical understanding of governance
realities, the authors rely exclusively on a variety of perception data to construct the WGI
(Kaufmann et al. 2011). These consist of surveys of governed individuals and firms,
assessments of governance by experts in both the public sector and in nongovernmental
2Kaufmann et al. 2011) define governance as, “the tradition and institutions by which authority in
a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and
replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and
(c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions
among them” (Kaufmann et al. 2011). ‘Voice and Accountability’ and ‘Political Stability and Absence
of Violence/Terrorism’ were defined to represent (a), ‘Government Effectiveness’ and ‘Regulatory Quality’
were defined to represent (b), and ‘Rule of Law’ and ‘Control of Corruption’ were defined to represent (c)
(Kaufmann et al. (Kaufmann et al. 2011)
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organizations, and related data produced by private information providers (Kaufmann et al.
2011). For each aspect of governance, data from these sources were selected if deemed able
to measure that aspect and subsequently rescaled and aggregated in a weighted average
using an unobserved components model to construct an overall indicator for that aspect
(Kaufmann et al. 2011). These indicators, defined in Table A.1, constitute the WGI.
I examine all six of these indicators for years 1996 to 2013 on the 3020 observations
that had scores for each indicator. Scores are normalized with mean 0 and standard
deviation of 1, and higher scores are given to countries that acheive better outcomes
represented by the indicator.
4.2 The International Country Risk Guide
The International Country Risk Guide, a preemient proprietary risk assessment index that
has been produced monthly by The PRS Group since 1984, is composed of three subindexes
(IRCG Methodology). Though the economic and financial indexes, standing on five
indicators apiece, do not attempt to measure governace capabilities, the third index does.
Named the Political Risk Rating, this index advances twelve indicators of “both political and
social attributes” of countries that are produced from the answers of ICRG staff to a
questionaire (The Political Risk Services Group 2014a). These are listed, with their
definitions, in Table A.2.
I examine the values of all twelve of these indicators for the 4,155 observations that
had values for each indicator (371 did not). These indicators span the years 1984 to 2014. I
assigned annual values to observations of the ICRG using data from October of the
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correpsonding year3
Each indicator is assigned a maximum value corresponding to how much the ICRG
authors believe the indicator impacts overall country risk4. The higher the score a country
receives on a particular indicator, the smaller the corresponding risk that it faces.
4.3 The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index
The Bertelsmann Stiftungs Transformation Index (BTI) has documented the progress of
developing and transition countries towards securing democracy and a market economy since
2003. Local experts and scholars are selected by the BTI staff to monitor and document this
progress in country analyses, which they use to answer 49 questions that assess various
aspects of these determinants. Responses are critiqued and scores are allotted to
corresponding subindicators, which are adjusted to ensure consistency across regions. These
subindicators are then aggregated into 17 indicators spanning two indexes, the Status Index
and the Management Index. The Status Index evaluates the democratic and economic status
of nations using Political Transformation indicators and Economic Transformation indicators,
whereas the Management Index measures the quality of governance that directs this
transformation (Bertlesmann Stiftung 2014a). One indicator, “Level of Difficulty,” was
dropped from the data set because it was simply a weighting function to aggregate indicators
into a comprehensible whole (Bertlesmann Stiftung 2014b). The resulting 16 indicators, and
their definitions, are listed in Table A.3 and Table A.4.
3I did not average the twelve months of data to produce an annual index because the ICRG data is ordinal,
and it does not make sense to average ordinal data.
4Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, Internal Conflict, and External Conflict have a maximum
value of twelve; Corruption, Military in Politics, Religious Tensions, Law and Order, Ethnic Tensions, and
Democratic Accountability have a maximum value of six; Bureaucracy Quality has a maximum value of four.
All indicators have a minimum value of zero (The Political Risk Services Group 2014a).
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There are 745 observations of these indicators, covering 2003 and biannually since 2006.
Higher values of an indicator are awarded to countries (from 0 to 10) demonstrate a
corresponding attribute that is better suited to successful transformation.
4.4 The Fragile States Index
The Fund for Peace maintains the Fragile States Index to deliver twelve annual indicators
(and more than one hundred sub-indicators) for risk facing countries since 2006. The Fund
for Peace searches and synthesizes relevant data from millions of articles and reports into
scores for these indicators using its in-house Conflict Assessment System Tool. These scores
are then adjusted using further qualitative and quanitative analysis and verification (FFP
Methodology). Three classes of indicators — Social, Economic, and Military and Political —
make up the Fragile States Index (The Fund For Peace 2014b). These twelve indicators, and
their definitions, are listed in Table A.5.
I examine these twelve indicators from years 2006 until 2014, which span 1,565
observations. The indicators assess governance on a zero to ten scale, which higher values of
indicators reflecting a more fragile corresponding attribute.
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CHAPTER 5
Methodology
Factor analysis is a classification of statistical analyses that reveals the underlying structure
responsible for the variation and intercorrelations of observed variables (Matsunaga 2010).
There are two types of factor analysis: exploratory factor analysis (EFA) models latent
variables that can best explain the variation and intercorrelations of observed variables, and
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) tests how well a model of latent variables can explain the
variation and intercorrelations of observed variables (Matsunaga 2010). The difference in the
function of these two factor analyses rests on the different assumptions that they bring to
bear on the same factor model.
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5.1 The Factor Model
5.1.1 Derivation of the Factor Model Problem
The factor model assumes that each observed variable of a data set is a linear combination of
their truly fundamental factors. Explictly:
y1 = µ1 + l11f1 + l12f2 + . . .+ l1nfn + ε1
y2 = µ2 + l21f1 + l22f2 + . . .+ l2nfn + ε2
...
ym = µm + lm1f1 + lm2f2 + . . .+ lmnfn + εm
(5.1)
such that lij is the loading of fj, the j
th fundamental factor, on yi, the i
th observed
variable. εi is the error of measuring yi such that Cov(fi, εi) = 0, and µi is the associated
regression intercept (Khattree 2000).
In other words,
y = µ+ Λf + ε (5.2)
where y is the m x 1 vector of the observed variables y1 . . . ym, Λ is the m x n matrix
containing the loading lij as its (i, j)
th element, f is the n x 1 vector of the fundamental
factors f1 . . . fn, ε is the m x 1 vector of the error terms ε1 . . . εm, and µ is the m x 1
vector of the intercepts.
The factor model is used to determine the characteristics of the fundamental factors
that underly the observed variables. But no information can be drawn from Equation 4.2
because every element on the right hand side of the equation is unobserved. The definition of
variance is helpful to manipulate Equation 4.2 into a more useful representation of the factor
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model (Hofacker 2007):
V (y) = E[(y− µ)(y− µ)′] (5.3)
and since from Equation 4.2
y− µ = Λf + ε (5.4)
then, as presented in Hofacker (2007),
V (y) = E[(Λf + ε)(Λf + ε)′]
= ΛE(ff ′)Λ′ + ΛE(fε′) + E(εf ′)Λ′ + E(εε′)
= ΛE(ff ′)Λ′ + E(εε′)
(5.5)
because Cov(f, ε) = 0
Let Ψ = V ar(f), Θ = V ar(ε), and V (y) = Σ. Then, as suggested by Harman (1976)
and Hofacker (2007),
Σ = ΛΨΛ′ + Θ (5.6)
The population variance-covariance matrix Σ is perfectly reproduced by Λ and Ψ,
which belong to the truly fundamental factors, and Θ. But Λ, Ψ and Θ are unknown since
the dynamics responsible for them are unknown. We are left to estimate these matrices,
which produce, as implied by Equation 4.7, an estimate of the population
variance-covariance matrix.
Σ̂ = Λ̂Ψ̂Λ̂
′
+ Θ̂ (5.7)
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The Λ̂, Ψ̂, and Θ̂ that most closely fit Λ, Ψ, and Θ will produce a Σ̂ that most
closely fits Σ. So the Λ̂, Ψ̂, and Θ̂ that produce the Σ̂ that most closely fits Σ are those
that best fits Λ, Ψ, and Θ. But Σ is also unknown, so we use the sample
variance-covariance matrix S to approximate Σ(WangandWang2012).
The factor model problem is thus
minimize
Λ̂, Ψ̂, Θ̂
|S− (Λ̂Ψ̂Λ̂′ + Θ̂)| (5.8)
so that the resulting Λ̂, Ψ̂, and Θ̂ most accurately fit Λ, Ψ, and Θ (Wang and Wang
2012).
5.1.2 How the Factor Model Estimates the Factors that
Fundamentally Drive the Observed Variables
An important assumption made by the factor model that had no bearing on the above
derivation is that Cov(εi, εj)i 6=j = 0. This, coupled with the previously declared assumption
that Cov(f, ε) = 0, means that εi ⊥ fk, εj 6=i ∀ i, j ε {1 . . .m},∀ k ε {1 . . . n}. Since the
variation of an observed variable is only produced by the fundamental forces and its error,
the error of a particular observed variable is unable to explain any of the variation of any
other observed variable. This means that the error of a particular observed variable is only
able to explain variation unique to that variable. This allows us to rename εi as the
uniqueness of the ith observed variable. V ar(εi) is thus the unique variance of the i
th
observed variable V aru(yi).
Solving Equation 4.8 is equivalent to solving
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minimize
Λ̂, Ψ̂, Θ̂
|(S− Θ̂)− (Λ̂Ψ̂Λ̂′)| (5.9)
Since Θ = V ar(ε), then Θii = V ar(εi) = V aru(yi) and Θij = 0 ∀i 6= j.
Since S is the sample variance-covariance matrix of the observed variables,
Sii = V ar(yi). The variance of the i
th variable can be decomposed as the sum of the variance
that it shares with others (its common variance, V arc(yi)) and the variance that it does not
share with others (V aru(yi)). Then Sii = V arc(yi) + V aru(yi) and Sij = Cov(yi, yj) ∀i 6= j
(DeVellis 2012).
It immediately follows that
(S− Θ̂)ii = (Sij − Θ̂ij) = (V arc(yi) + V aru(yi))− V aru(yi) = V arc(yi)
(S− Θ̂)ij = (Sij − Θ̂ij) = Cov(yi, yj)− 0 = Cov(yi, yj)
Every element of S− Θ̂ only represents the communalities of the observed variables,
either by representing the variance of an observed variable that is common to others or the
covariance of a variable with another(DeVellis 2012). Since the factor model problem
amounts to solving Equation 4.9, Λ̂ and Φ̂ are chosen to approximate these communalities
as closely as possible. Since Λ̂ and Φ̂ result from the estimated factor structure, the factor
model problem identifies the factors that most closely explain all of the communalities of the
observed variables (DeVellis 2012). The factor model thus estimates the factors that are the
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fundamental drivers of the observed variables1
.
5.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis
5.2.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis
EFA solves the factor model problem (Equation 4.9) to determine the forces that are
fundamental to the observed variables. It is suggested to use Principal Factors (PF) to solve
EFA’s factor model problem2
Of note but of no consequence, this technique examines the sample correlation matrix
R rather than the sample variance-covariance matrix S(Preacher and MacCallum 2003)).
Indeed, the analysis is the same; the factors that reproduce R− Θ̂ as closely as possible
approximate as closely as possible the fundamental factors of the system.
1There is considerable general confusion concerning the differences in assumptions and application of factor
analysis and the related principal component analysis (PCA) (Fabrigar 1999). The above intuition confirms
the use of factor analysis over principal component analysis (PCA) to determine the underlying fundamental
structure of a data set. PCA also claims that observed variables are linear combinations of factors called
principal components (keeping with the structure of Equation 4.1), but PCA does not make the assumption
that Cov(εi, εj)i 6=j = 0(Fabrigar 1999). But it was this assumption that allowed FA to determine the factors
that are fundamental to the observed variables. Remember that εi (along with the extracted factors) explains
some of the variation of yi. Because measurement errors can correlate in PCA, then εi captures some of the
variation of yj ∀j 6= i (DeVellis 2012). Since observed variables can thus be written as the linear combination
of these “measurement errors” and principal components, then the measurement errors of Equation 4.1 in the
PCA model are actually just principal components as well. This is why PCA does not include measurement
errors in its model. Since the PCA model assumes that the observed variables are the linear combinations of
the true principal components, the PCA model estimates the principal components that best represents the
total variation of the observed variables (Kolenikov 2009). This means that PCA is an effective data reduction
tool (Costello and Osborne 2005). However, since the extracted principal components cannot distinguish
between common and unique variation of the data set (Costello and Osborne 2005), the PCA model does
not claim to reveal the forces that best represent the communalities of the observed variables; the principal
components are not estimates of the fundamental factors of the data set (Harman 1976).
2Maximum Likelihood estimates should not be used to produce EFA (Fabrigar 1999). Rather, Principal
Factors should be used, especially if data is nonnormal, for it imposes no distributional assumptions on the
data. (Fabrigar 1999)
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Since R− Θ̂ is symmetric, by eigendecomposition (Khattree 2000 and Cureton 1983)
(R− Θ̂) = Υ∆Υ−1 (5.10)
where ∆ is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of R (with ∆ii = δi > δj ∀i, j | i < j)
and Υ is the corresponding martix of orthonormal eigenvectors.
Since Υ has orthonormal columns, Υ−1 = Υ′. By Cholesky factorization,
∆ = (∆1/2)′(∆1/2). But since ∆1/2 is a diagonal matrix, (∆1/2)′ = ∆1/2. Then Equation
4.10 becomes, following (Cureton 1983)
(R− Θ̂) = Υ∆Υ′
(R− Θ̂) = Υ(∆1/2)′∆1/2Υ′
(R− Θ̂) = Υ∆1/2(∆1/2)′Υ′
(R− Θ̂) = (Υ∆1/2)(Υ∆1/2)′
(5.11)
To determine (Υ∆1/2), the diagonal matrix Θ̂ must be estimated. PF assumes that
Θ̂ii =
1
R−1ii
(Khattree 2000). Then (R− Θ̂)ii = 1− 1R−1ii and (R− Θ̂)ij = Rij ∀i 6= j.
3 With
this information, Υ and ∆1/2 can be computed.
PF chooses Λ̂ and Ψ̂ to fit
(R− Θ̂) = Λ̂Ψ̂Λ̂′ (5.12)
Then by combining Equations 4.11 and 4.12, PF chooses Λ̂ and Ψ̂ to fit
31 − 1
R−1ii
is called the squared multiple correlation (SMC) of the ith observed variable. The SMC is a
commonly used estimate of the communalities of an observed variable with all other variables, and is thus an
appropriate assumed estimate of (R− Θ̂)ii)(Khattree and Naik 2000)
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Λ̂Ψ̂Λ̂
′
= (Υ∆1/2)(Υ∆1/2)′ (5.13)
where (Υ∆1/2)(Υ∆1/2)′ represents the communalities of the observed variables.
There are two unknowns, Λ̂ and Ψ̂. PF needs to make an assumption about one of
these to determine the other. PF chooses to assume that Ψ̂ is the identity matrix, which
stipulates that the fundamental forces extracted by PF are orthogonal (Khattree and Naik
2000). This assumption is made without loss of generality of the final result of EFA; though
intial factors extracted by PF must be orthogonal by this assumption, rotation techniques
are employed following PF to relax this assumption (Khattree and Naik 2000). Then
Equation 4.13 becomes
Λ̂Λ̂
′
= (Υ∆1/2)(Υ∆1/2)′ (5.14)
Λ̂ = Υ∆1/2 (5.15)
where the ith column of Λ̂, the loadings of the ith factor on the observed variables, is
formed from the product of the ith eigenvalue δi and its corresponding eigenvector. Since
δi > δj ∀i < j and Ψ̂ = I, the first extracted factor explains the maximum amount of
common variation of the observed variables, the second extracted factor explains the
maximum amount of common variation of the observed variables that was not explained by
the first extracted factor, and so forth.
But in their attempt to explain the maximum amount of common variation of the
observed variables, the extracted factors do not attempt to distinguish the specific patterns
of common variation produced by the fundamental factors of the variables (Comrey and Lee
1992). Indeed, an extracted factor represents common variation generated by multiple
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fundamental factors because the extracted factor attempts to represent as much of the
unexplained common variation of the observed variables as possible, even though this
common variation is generated by multiple fundamental factors (Comrey and Lee 1992). An
extracted factor is thus not a representation of one and only one factor fundamental to the
observed variables (Comrey and Lee 1992). This is further evident by the fact that these
extracted factors are forced to be orthogonal, though fundamental factors are likely
correlated.
To reveal close representations of the fundamental factors, we must rotate the
extracted factors. Rotation adjusts the loadings of factors to more accurately represent the
specific patterns of common variation of the observed variables4(Comrey and Lee 1992). The
rotated factors are allowed to correlate, which also produces a more realistic estimation of
Ψ̂5. In particular, if there exist n fundamental factors, then rotation identifies n factors that
are close approximations of the fundamental factors that produced these patterns of common
variation.
Given the initial loading matrix Λ for the first n extracted factors, I can choose any
orthonormal weight matrix C as per ( B7) to rotate the initially extracted factors that
produces a new loading matrix Λ∗ following
Λ∗ = C−1Λ (5.16)
where the correlations of the rotated factors is determined by Ψ∗ = CC′ (Hofacker
4This is admittedly vague, and rotation methods solve whatever optimization problem they believe will
produced rotated factors that represent these patterns of common variation. But one common guideline of
rotation is to acheive simple structure: observed variables are driven by a limited number of fundamental
factors and fundamental factors drive a limited number of observed variables (Comrey and Lee 1992)
5This form of rotation is called oblique rotation and is preferred to orthogonal rotation. Orthogonal
rotation produces rotated factors that remain orthogonal, which is a strict and likely incorrect assumption
placed on the characterization of the fundamental factors (Comrey and Lee 1992).
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2007).
It follows that
Λ = Λ∗C (5.17)
PF produced estimates for Λ̂ that identify the n factors that most closely fit the
common variation and intercorrelations of the observed variables. If PF were to instead
estimate Λ̂∗ and Ψ̂∗ to most closely fit these communalities, it would solve, following
(Hofacker 2007)
(R− Θ̂) = Λ̂∗Ψ̂∗(Λ̂∗)′ (5.18)
(R− Θ̂) = Λ̂∗CC′(Λ̂∗)′
(R− Θ̂) = (Λ̂∗C)(C′(Λ̂∗)′)
(R− Θ̂) = (Λ̂∗C)(Λ̂∗C)′
(R− Θ̂) = Λ̂Λ̂′ (5.19)
Fitting Equation 4.18 is equivalent to fitting Equation 4.19, which was able to produce
the closest approximation, using n factors, of the communalities of the observed variables. In
this sense, rotation reveals rotated factors that are just as able as the initially extracted
factors to explain the common variation and intercorrelation of the observed variables.
Furthermore, the loadings and correlations of these rotated factors are selected to allow these
factors to distinguish the fundamental forces that produce the patterns of common variation
and intercorrelation of the observed variables (Hofacker 2007). Given that the number of
fundamental factors was correctly assumed, these rotated factors, EFA claims, are the closest
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representations of the factors that are fundamental to the observed variables (Hofacker 2007)6
5.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis
While EFA hypothesizes the underlying dynamics of observed variables, it is the role of CFA
to test the validity of theories of these dynamics. In particular, EFA imposes no structure on
how factors relate to observed variables; EFA chooses each value of the loading matrix to
produce factors that best explain the observed common variation and intercorrelation of the
observed variables. CFA, on the other hand, assumes that factors not theorized to be
fundamental to particular observed variables do not load on those variables7 (Wang and
Wang 2012). Theory stipulates that the remaining loadings characterize how observed
variables are generated from their fundamental factors. CFA estimates these unrestricted
loadings to produce factors, aligned with the theory, that best explain the observed common
variation and intercorrelation of the observed variables. CFA then assesses how well these
factors are actually able to explain these communalities, which indicates the validity of the
theory.
In this sense, CFA amounts to a restricted EFA; both solve the factor model problem,
though CFA uses theory to initially restrict the values of certain parameters (Wang and
Wang 2012) . It is suggested to solve CFA’s factor model problem for non-normal observed
variables using Robust Maximum Likelihood.8
6I used Stata 13.1 to run PF on the indicators. Commonalities were estimated by SMCs. Promax rotation,
which is a hybrid of orthogonal and obliquerotation that allows rotated factors to explain as much distinct
common variation as possible while still realistically allowing them to be correlated with each other, (Rennie
1997) was used to determine the rotated factors.
7This amounts to setting the loading of these factors on those variables to zero.
8Maximum Likelihood (ML) is commonly used to estimate the parameters of CFA for continuous data
sets, but its standard errors (though not its parameter estimates) are sensitve to nonormality of data sets
(Flora and Curran 2004). Applying ML to the asymptotic covariance matrix estimated from the sample
correlation matrix produces standard errors that are robust to nonnormality (Brown 2015). I produce the
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The estimated parameters produce factors that are the best approximations to the
data set given the restrictions of the initial theory. CFA then uses fit indexes to test how
well these factors approximate the patterns of commonalities of the data set. The most
popular fit index that compares standardized residuals of the observed covariance matrix and
the predicted covariance matrix is called the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual
(SRMR) (Matsunaga 2010). CFA estimates the value of SRMR, and values of SRMR less
than 0.08 indicate that the hypothesized theory is consistent with the observed patterns of
commonalities of the data set (Stata 2013).
5.4 How to Use EFA and CFA to Determine the
Fundamental Factors of Observed Variables
5.4.1 Pairing EFA and CFA
The distinct functions of EFA and CFA suggest their compatability to determine and
validate the fundamental factors of a data set; EFA should be used to construct a theory of
the dynamics underlying a data set, and CFA should be used to test the validity of the
theory. EFA and CFA should not be both applied to the same observations of the data set9,
however, but rather to distinct randomized samples from the same data set (Cureton and
D’Agostino 1983; Fabrigar 1999). The aim of factor analysis is to determine the fundamental
factors of the data set, which are consequently the fundamental factors of both randomized
samples. Consistency of the theory with the observed variation and intercorrleation of two
distinct randomized samples of the same data set provides strong support for the theory’s
characterization of the fundamental factors of the data set (Cureton and D’Agostino 1983).
asymptotic covariance matrix with Huber White estimators in Stata.
9CFA following EFA on the same sample reveals no information. Indeed, this merely amounts to testing
the validity of a theory to explain the very variations and intercorrelations of observations that were used to
construct the theory.
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Conversely, if a theory is not consistent across randomized samples, then the theory does not
characterize the fundamental factors of the data set. This is why I choose, when possible, to
run CFA on a random subsample of the same data set to confirm the validity of my
hypothesized factors. Spurious discrepancies from the commonalities implied by the
fundamental factors differ across randomized samples of the same data set. For this reason,
if EFA is tricked into approximating the spurious discrepancies of a random sample of a data
set, CFA will likely deem these approximations as poor fits of the commonalities of a
different random sample of the same data set.
I produced two disjoint randomized samples of observations for each state capability
index10. For each state capability index, I produced a theory of its fundamental factors by
applying EFA to all observations of Group 1. I then tested the validity of this theory to
characterize the fundamental factors of the entire data set by applying CFA to all
observations of Group 2.
5.4.2 Using EFA to Determine the Number of Fundamental
Forces
EFA produces the factors that are the best approximations of an assumed number of
fundamental factors of a data set. It is not obvious, however, how many fundamental factors
actually exist. Approximations of the complete set of fundamental factors should explain
much of the variation of the data set. The amount of variation explained by a set of n
factors that approximate the fundamental factors is revealed by the eigenvalues of the first n
10For each index, I grouped countries by their development status, according to development status
indicated by the World Development Indicators (The World Bank Group 2014). Within each such group, I
assigned a random number between 0 and 1 to each country and then ordered countries by the value of their
random number. All observations of the countries that had an odd rank within their development group were
placed in Group 1 of the index that I call, for example, WGI.1. All other observations were placed in Group
2 of the index, which I call, for example WGI.2.
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factors initially extracted by EFA. Assuming that approximations of fundamental factors
should explain more variation that that of additional factors that do not approximate truly
fundamental factors, the scree test suggests that the first m eigenvalues that are significantly
greater than the subsequent eigenvalues implies that there exist at least m fundamental
factors (Comrey and Lee 1992)11.
The scree test only demonstrates how well variation, in aggregate, is explained by a
given approximation of fundamental factors. Eigenvalues make no claim, however, about how
well these approximations are able to represent the specific patterns of variation that are
driven by fundamental factors. An examination of the fit to the observed variables of various
sets of factors produced by EFA that best explain an assumed number of fundamental
factors speaks to this and suggests stronger evidence concerning how many fundamental
factors actually exist. For this reason, an analysis of the redisuals of the covariance matrix of
the observed variables implied by the factors produced by EFA and the sample covariance
matrix suggests the number of fundamental factors. This analysis is guided by the fact that
though fundamental factors explain much of the observed common variation and
intercorrelations of the observed variables, they are unable to explain all of these
communalities12. In this sense, if EFA assumes that there exist fewer fundamental factors
than actually exist, it would not produce approximations of every fundamental factor and
11Kaiser’s criterion is another popular assessment of eigenvalues to determine the number of fundamental
forces of a data set. Assuming that approximations of fundamental factors should explain more variation than
that of a signle observed variable (corresponding to an eigenvalue of 1) if these factors were truly fundamental
to the data set, Kaiser’s criterion suggests that m eigenvalues greater than 1 implies that there exist at
least m fundamental factors (Preacher and MacCallum 2003). However, Kaiser’s criterion must be applied
to the eigenvalues of the unreduced correlation matrix, which is produced by PCA, not EFA. Further, it is
considered so inaccurate that there is little reason to use it (Comrey and Lee 1992; Fabrigar 1999; Preacher
and MacCallum 2003)
12Though there may exist two observed variables that are manifestations of the same fundamental factor,
they are not exact representations of the factor (or else there would be no difference between these two
observed variables). There is thus variation, even spurious common variation and intercorrelations, between
observed variables because of the measurement error involved in producing indicators that are driven by the
same fundamental factor.
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the resulting factors would be unable to explain the esential patterns of observed common
variation and intercorrelation of observed variables. If EFA correctly assumes the number of
fundamental factors, it would produce factors that closely approximate the fundamental
factors, and so would explain the patterns of communalities well. If EFA assumes that there
exist more fundamental factors than actually exist, it would also produce approximations of
the measurement errors of the observed variables (what is not explained by the fundamental
factors), but would misleadingly call these forces fundamental to the data set (Comrey and
Lee 1992; Fabrigar 1999).
Sets of factors produced by EFA that do not fit the observed communalities well, as
indicated by high residuals13 between the predicted correlation matrix and the sample
correlation matrix, are unlikely to approximate the correct number of fundamental factors.
In particular, a high proportion of residuals ¿ 0.05 and several residuals above 0.1 indicate
poor fit of the suggested factors to explain the commonalities of the data set (Comrey and
Lee 1992). Further, the set of factors that assumes the fewest factors among the sets of
factors that properly explain the observed communalities, as indicated by generally low
residuals between the predicted correlation matrix and the sample correlation matrix, is the
most parsimoius and likely to reveal the true number of fundamental factors of a data set
(Fabrigar 1999).
5.4.3 Using EFA to Identify the Fundamental Factors
EFA is used to characterize the fundamental factors of a data set. Once the number of
fundamental factors is determined, we must thus characterize the factors that most closely
approximate the set of these fundamental factors. Since a loading of a factor on an observed
13But for space concerns I choose not to display these redisuals.
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variable indicates how much that variable is driven by that factor, factors that load heavily
on particular observed variables are thought to drive those indicators. It is commonly
assumed that factors that are truly fundamental to observed variables should have loadings
that are at least greater than 0.3 (Comrey and Lee 1992; Wang and Wang 2012). A more
rigorous analysis of loadings also assumes that factors truly fundamental to a set of observed
variables should have loadings on those variables that are significantly greater than loadings
on variables that are not thought to be driven by that factor. I use these two rules to
determine which observed variables are driven by which factors.
Once I understand which factors produced by EFA drive which observed variables, I
then attempt to define these factors to fully characterize the fundamental factors of a data
set. Because observed variables that are only driven by one factor are alternative
manifestations of the same fundamental factor, I examine the similarities of their definitions
in order to suggest the identity of the factor that is fundamental to all of them. This
identification must be consistent with the definitions of the observed variables that are
driven by this factor as well as by other fundamental factors, and not consistent with the
definitions of the observed variables that are not driven by this factor. Once I determined
the number, impact, and identity of the factors that most closely represent the fundamental
factors of a data set, I produced a model of these hypothesized dynamics.
5.4.4 Using CFA to Verify the Theorized Fundamental Factors
CFA tests if a hypothesized model of the fundamental factors of a data set can predict the
observed patterns of communalities of the data set. The most important result of CFA,
therefore, is the assessment of the fit of the model to the data set. Further, if a factor
actually drives an observed variable, then CFA’s parameter estimate for the impact of the
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factor on this observed variable should be significant and positive14. Verification of the fit
and sensibility of the hypothesized model indicate that the model is an accurate
representation of the fundamental factors of a data set. This verification alone does not
suggest that this model identifies the true dynamic driving the sample, let alone the data set
the sample came from. But if CFA verifies that a hypothesized model produced by EFA on a
randomized sample of the data set is also able to explain the dynamics of another
randomized sample of the data set, it is likely that the model is a true representation of the
forces driving the variation of the data set.
14But for space concerns I choose not to display these parameter estimates and their standard errors.
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CHAPTER 6
Analysis: Identifying the Forces Driving Particular State Capability
Indexes
The following determines the underlying factors that drive a particular governance index.
6.1 The Worldwide Governance Indicators
6.1.1 Determining the Number of Forces Driving the WGI
I conducted EFA on the six indicators of the WGI of the first randomized group of countries
(WGI.1). Table A.6 displays the eigenvalues of each initially extracted factor.The scree plot
of the eigenvalues of Table A.6, displayed in Figure B.1 suggests that only one factor drives
the commonalities of the WGI; there appears to be little difference between the eigenvalue of
the second extracted factor and that of all subsequent extracted factors.
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The loadings of Table A.7, however, indicate that there may be a second factor that
drives the communalities of the WGIs; “Political Stability and Absence of Violence /
Terrorism” and “Voice and Accountability” are loaded relatively lightly by the first extracted
factor compared to the loadings on the other indicators of the WGI. One factor alone may
not be sufficient to explain all of the essential patterns of common variation and
intercorrelation of the WGIs, though it explains much of the commonalities of the WGI as a
whole. Further, a relatively high percentage (20%, 3/15) of the pairwise correlation residuals
generated from the predicted correlation matrix using just the first extracted factor are
greater than 0.05. One factor alone does not appear to adequately represent the information
of the WGI.
I then rotated the first two factors extracted by EFA. Since none of the residuals
generated from the estimated correlation matrix using these two factors are greater than
0.05, it indeed appears that two factors drive the commonalities of the WGI. These forces
are represented by the rotated first two extracted factors, and the loadings of these forces on
each indicator of the WGI are presented in Table A.21.
6.1.2 Identifying the Forces Driving the WGI
To characterize the forces that drive the communalities of the WGI, I have displayed the
indicators and their definitions in order of their loadings by the first rotated factor in Table
A.8 and by the second rotated factor in Table A.9. As shown by Table A.8, the first force
loads heavily on four indicators, and these loadings are substantially greater than the
loadings of this force on the other indicators - the fourth largest loading of the first force on
an indicator is 0.5422, while the fifth largest loading of the first force on an indicator is only
0.3265. It appears that the first force drives the communalities of these four indicators.
As shown by Table A.9, the second force loads heavily on four indicators, and these
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loadings are substantially greater than the loadings of this force on the other indicators - the
fourth largest loading of the second force on an indicator is 0.3785, while the fifth largest
loading of the second force on an indicator is only 0.1330. It appears that the second force
drives the communalities of these four indicators.
The names of the indicators that are only driven by the first factor are displayed in
bold in Table A.8. Higher values of these two indicators are given to governments that are
better able to provide serivces for their citizens and implement sound policies. The
fundamental factor of these indicators thus seems to represent a government’s competence to
provide for its citizens, and I call this fundamental factor “Competence.”
The names of the indicators that are only driven by the second factor are displayed in
bold in Table A.9. Higher values of these two indicators are given to nations in which
citizens have greater control of their government and are less likely to overthrow or subvert
the rules of their government. The fundamental factor of these indicators thus seems to
represent the vigor of the social contract between citizens and their government, and I call
this fundamental factor the “Vigor of Social Contract.”
Two indicators are driven by both fundamental forces. Their definitions are consistent
with my identification of these fundamental forces. In particular, “Rule of Law” measures
both the competence of the government to enforce the legal system (factor 1) and the
likelihood that citizens subvert the rules set forth by this legal system (factor 2). “Control of
Corruption” measures how much effort governments exert to provide for its citizens (factor 1)
and the extent to which governments are controlled by the demands of its citizens (factor 2).
Further, my identification of each fundamental force is not consistent with the definitions of
the indicators that I believe are not driven by this force.
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The above analysis suggests the number, impact, and identity of the forces that drive
the commonalities of the WGI. The hypothesized model of this dynamic is presented in
Figure B.2.
6.1.3 Verifying the Hypothesized Model
To test its validity to characterize the forces driving the commonalitis of the WGI, I
conducted CFA of the hypothesized model on the six indicators of the WGI of the second
randomized group of countries (WGI.2). The value of SRMR is 0.025, which indicates that
the hypothesized model explains the observed commonalities of the sample very well.
Furthermore, the parameter estimates are significant and consistent with the hypothesized
model. CFA confirms the validity of the hypothesized model to characterize the factors that
drive the commonalities of this randomized sample of the WGI.
The hypothesized model characterizing the forces driving the commonalities of the
WGI was determined through EFA on one random sample of observations of the WGI and
confirmed through CFA on a disjoint random sample of observations of the WGI. The model
presented in Figure B.2 thus characterizes the forces that drive the commonalities of the
WGI.
6.2 The International Country Risk Guide
6.2.1 Determining the Number of Forces Driving the ICRG
I conducted EFA on the twelve indicators of the ICRG of the first randomized group of
countries (ICRG.1). Table A.6 displays the eigenvalues of each initially extracted factor. The
scree plot of the eigenvalues of Table A.6, displayed in Figure B.1, suggests that three factors
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drive the variation of the ICRG; there is quite a difference between the eigenvalue of the
third extracted factor and that of the fourth extracted factor, though there appears to be
little difference between the eigenvalue of the fourth extracted factor and that of all
subsequent extracted factors.
Analysis of the pairwise correlation residuals of the predicted correlation matrix
generated by EFA’s best approximation of an alternative number of fundamental factors
corroborates the suggestion of the scree plot. A very high percentage (62%, 41/66) of these
residuals using just the first extracted factor are greater than 0.05, with 18 of them greater
than 0.1 and the maximum residual as large as 0.2918. A high percentage (43.9%, 29/66) of
these residuals using the first two rotated factors are greater than 0.05, with 8 of them
greater than 0.1 and the maximum residual as large as 0.1909. But a much smaller
percentage (16.7%, 11/66) of these residuals using the rotated first three extracted factors
are greater than 0.05. and only one residual, with value 0.1049, is greater than 0.1. It indeed
appears that three forces drive the commonalities of the ICRG. These forces are represented
by the rotated first three extracted factors, and the loadings of these forces on each indicator
of the ICRG are presented in Table A.21.
6.2.2 Identifying the Forces Driving the ICRG
To characterize the forces that drive the communalities of the ICRG, I have displayed the
indicators and their definitions in order of their loadings by the first rotated factor in Table
A.10, by the second rotated factor in Table A.11, and by the third rotated factor in Table
A.12. As shown by Table A.10, the first force loads heavily on six indicators, and these
loadings are substantially greater than the loadings of this force on the other indicators - the
sixth largest loading of the first force on an indicator is 0.5321, while the seventh largest
loading of the first force on an indicator is only 0.2645. It appears that the first force drives
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the communalities of these six indicators.
As shown by Table A.11, the second force loads heavily on four indicators, and these
loadings are substantially greater than the loadings of this force on the other indicators - the
fourth largest loading of the second force on an indicator is 0.5367, while the fifth largest
loading of the second force on an indicator is only 0.3245. It appears that the second force
drives the communalities of these four indicators.
As shown by Table A.12, the third force loads heavily on two indicators, and these
loadings are substantially greater than the loadings of this force on the other indicators - the
second largest loading of the third force on an indicator is 0.6515, while the third largest
loading of the second force on an indicator is only 0.2901. It appears that the third force
drives the communalities of these two indicators.
Each indicator of the ICRG is only driven by one fundamental factor. The names of
the indicators that are only driven by the first factor are displayed in bold in Table A.10.
Higher values of these six indicators are given to governments that are both more willing and
able to effectively serve its citizens. The fundamental factor of these indicators thus seems to
represent the quality of governance. Since the definitions of the remaining indicators, whose
names are not listed in bold in Table A.10, are not consistent with this identification, I call
this fundamental factor the “Quality of Governance.”
The names of the indicators that are only driven by the second factor are displayed in
bold in Table A.11. Higher values of these four indicators reflect a reduced prevalence of
tensions and conflict at work in a country. Since the definitions of the remaining indicators,
whose names are not listed in bold in Table A.11, are not consistent with this identification,
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I call this fundamental factor “Lack of Tensions and Conflict.”
The names of the indicators that are only driven by the third factor are displayed in
bold in Table A.12. Higher values of these two indicators reflect an increased faith in the
government and the legitimacy of the transactions within its society. The fundamental factor
of these indicators thus seems to represent a perception of legitimacy . Since the definitions
of the remaining indicators, whose names are not listed in bold font in Table A.12, are not
consistent with this identification, I call this fundamental factor “Legitimacy.”
The above analysis suggests the number, impact, and identity of the forces that drive
the commonalities of the ICRG. The hypothesized model of this dynamic is presented in
Figure B.3.
6.2.3 Verifying the Hypothesized Model
To test its validity to characterize the forces driving the commonalities of the ICRG, I
conducted CFA of the hypothesized model on the twelve indicators of the ICRG of the
second randomized group of countries (ICRG.2). The value of SRMR was 0.062, which
indicates that the hypothesized model explains the observed commonalities of the sample
quite well. Furthermore, the parameter estimates are significant and consistent with the
hypothesized model. CFA confirms the validity of the hypothesized model to characterize
the factors that drive the commonalities of this randomized sample of the ICRG.
The hypothesized model characterizing the forces driving the commonalities of the
ICRG was determined through EFA on one random sample of observations of the ICRG and
confirmed through CFA on a disjoint random sample of observations of the ICRG. The model
presented in Figure B.3 thus characterizes the forces that drive the variation of the ICRG.
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6.3 The Bertlesmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index
6.3.1 Determining the Number of Forces Driving the BTI
I conducted EFA on the sixteen indicators of the BTI of the first randomized group of
countries. Table A.6 displays the eigenvalues of each initially extracted factor. The scree plot
of the eigenvalues of Table A.6, displayed in Figure B.1, suggests that two factors drive the
commonalities of the BTI; there appears to be a difference betwween the eigenvalue of the
second extracted factor and that of the third extracted factor, while there appears to be
little difference between the eigenvalue of the third extracted factor and that of all
subsequent extracted factors.
Analysis of the pairwise correlation residuals of the predicted correlation matrix
generated by EFA’s best approximation of an alternative number of fundamental factors
verifies the suggested number of forces driving the commonalities of the BTI. A very high
percentage (70%, 84/120) of these residuals using just the first extracted factor are greater
than 0.05, with 38 of them greater than 0.1 and the maximum residual as large as 0.2971. A
very low percentage (10%, 12/120) of these residuals using the rotated first two extracted
factors are greater than 0.05, on the other hand, and only one residual, with value 0.1005, is
greater than 0.1. It indeed appears that two forces drive the commonalities of the BTI.
These forces are represented by the rotated first two extracted factors, and the loadings of
these forces on each indicator of the BII are presented in Table A.21.
6.3.2 Identifying the Forces Driving the BTI
To characterize the forces that drive the communalities of the BTI, I have displayed the
indicators and their definitions in order of their loadings by the first rotated factor in Table
A.13 and by the second rotated factor in Table A.14. As shown by Table A.13, the first force
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loads heavily on eleven indicators, and these loadings are substantially greater than the
loadings of this force on the other indicators - the eleventh largest loading of the first force
on an indicator is 0.5066, while the twelveth largest loading of the first force on an indicator
is only 0.1411. It appears that the first force drives the communalities of these eleven
indicators.
As shown by Table A.14, the second force loads heavily on nine indicators, and these
loadings are substantially greater than the loadings of this force on the other indicators - the
ninth largest loading of the second force on an indicator is 0.3134, while the tenth largest
loading of the second force on an indicator is only 0.2614. It appears that the second force
drives the communalities of these nine indicators.
The names of the indicators that are only driven by the first factor are displayed in
bold in Table A.13. Higher values of these seven indicators are given to governments that are
more responsive to the wills of its citizens and more politically savvy. The fundamental
factor of these indicators thus seems to represent the political gumption of a government.
Governments with more political gumption are more spirited in their response to the
demands of its citizens and consequently muster greater political energy and resourcefulness
to satisfy these demands. I thus call this fundamental factor “Political Gumption.”
The names of the indicators that are only driven by the second factor are displayed in
bold in Table A.14. Higher values of these five indicators are given to governments that
support and acheive better societal outcomes. The fundamental factor of these indicators
thus seems to represent the societal outcomes produced by a government, and I call this
fundamental factor the “Outcomes.”
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Four indicators are driven by both fundamental forces. Their definitions are consistent
with my identification of these fundamental forces. In particular, each of these indicators
measures the quality of the support produced by the political system (factor 1) in order to
produce better outcomes for its citizens (factor 2). Further, my identification of each
fundamental force is not consistent with the definitions of the indicators that I believe are
not driven by this force.
The above analysis suggests the number, impact, and identity of the forces that drive
the commonalities of the BTI. The hypothesized model of this dynamic is presented in
Figure B.4.
6.3.3 Verifying the Hypothesized Model
To test its validity to characterize the forces driving the commonalities of the BTI, I
conducted CFA of the hypothesized model on the sixteen indicators of the BTI of the second
randomized group of countries (BTI.2). The value of SRMR was 0.058, which indicates that
the hypothesized model explains the observed commonalities of the sample quite well.
Furthermore, the parameter estimates are significant and consistent with the hypothesized
model. CFA confirms the validity of the hypothesized model to characterize the factors that
drive the commonalities of this randomized sample of the ICRG.
The hypothesized model characterizing the forces driving the variation of the BTI was
determined through EFA on one random sample of observations of the BTI and confirmed
through CFA on a disjoint random sample of observations of the BTI. The model presented
in Figure B.4 thus characterizes the forces that drive the variation of the BTI.
47
6.4 The Fragile State Index
6.4.1 Determining the Number of Forces Driving the FSI
I conducted EFA on the twelve indicators of the FSI of the first randomized group of
countries (FSI.1). Table A.6 displays the eigenvalues of each initially extracted factor. The
scree plot of the eigenvalues of Table A.6, displayed in Figure B.1, suggests that only one
factor drives the commonalities of the FSI; there appears to be little difference between the
eigenvalue of the second extracted factor and that of all subsequent extracted factors.
The loadings of Table A.7, however, indicate that there may be a second force that
drives the commonalities of the FSI; several indicators, especially “Refugees and IDPs,” are
loaded relatively lightly by the first extracted factor compared to the loadings on the other
indicators of the FSI. One factor alone may not be sufficient to explain all of the essential
patterns of common variation and intercorrelation of the FSI, though it explains much of the
commonalities of the FSI as a whole. Further, a high percentage (34.8%, 23/66) of the
pairwise correlation residuals generated from the estimated correlation matrix using just the
first extracted factor are greater than 0.05. One factor alone does not appear to adequately
represent the information of the FSI.
I then rotated the first two factors extracted by EFA. Since a much lower percentage
(10.6%, 7/66) of the residuals generated from the estimated correlation matrix using these
two factors are greater than 0.05, it indeed appears that two forces drive the commonalities
of the FSI. These forces are represented by the rotated first two extracted factors, and the
loadings of these forces on each indicator of the FSI are presented in Table A.21.
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6.4.2 Identifying the Forces Driving the FSI
To characterize the forces that drive the communalities of the FSI, I have displayed the
indicators and their definitions in order of their loadings by the first rotated factor in Table
A.15 and by the second rotated factor in Table A.16. As shown by Table A.15, the first force
loads heavily on seven indicators, and these loadings are substantially greater than the
loadings of this force on the other indicators - the seventh largest loading of the first force on
an indicator is 0.4407, while the eigth largest loading of the first force on an indicator is only
0.3159. It appears that the first force drives the communalities of these seven indicators.
As shown by Table A.16, the second force loads heavily on six indicators, and these
loadings are substantially greater than the loadings of this force on the other indicators - the
sixth largest loading of the second force on an indicator is 0.4902, while the seventh largest
loading of the second force on an indicator is 0.3431. It appears that the second force drives
the communalities of these six indicators.
The names of the indicators that are only driven by the first factor are displayed in
bold in Table A.15. Higher values of these six indicators reflect increased group differences
and tensions at work in a country. The fundamental factor of these indicators thus seems to
represent these group differences and tensions and I call this fundamental factor “Group
Differences and Tensions.”
The names of the indicators that are only driven by the second factor are displayed in
bold in Table A.16. Higher values of these five indicators are given to less effective
governments who are less able to provide services and better outcomes for their citizens. The
fundamental factor of these indicators thus seems to represent the extent to which a
government lacks the competence to provide for its citizens, and I call this fundamental
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factor the “Lack of Competence.”
One indicator is driven by both fundamental forces - “Uneven Economic Development.”
Its definition is consistent with my identification of these fundamental forces. In particular,
this indicator measures disparities of economic outcomes (factor 2) across ethnic and
religious groups (factor 1). Further, my identification of each fundamental force is not
consistent with the definitions of the indicators that I believe are not driven by this force.
The above analysis suggests the number, impact, and identity of the forces that drive
the commonalities of the FSI. The hypothesized model of this dynamic is presented in Figure
B.5.
6.4.3 Verifying the Hypothesized Model
To test its validity to characterize the forces driving the commonalities of the FSI, I
conducted CFA of the hypothesized model on the twelve indicators of the FSI of the second
randomized group of countries (FSI.2). The value of SRMR was 0.045, which indicates that
the hypothesized model explains the observed commonalities of the sample very well.
Furthermore, the parameter estimates are significant and consistent with the hypothesized
model. CFA confirms the validity of the hypothesized model to characterize the factors that
drive the commonalities of this randomized sample of the FSI.
The hypothesized model characterizing the forces driving the commonalities of the FSI
was determined through EFA on one random sample of observations of the FSI and
confirmed through CFA on a disjoint random sample of observations of the FSI. The model
presented in Figure B.5 thus characterizes the forces that drive the commonalities of the FSI.
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6.5 Discussion
I have identified the best approximations of the factors that explain the patterns of common
variation and intercorrelation of each studied state capability index. But are these the truly
fundamental factors of these indexes? Even more provacatively, are some of these factors
fundamental to not just one index, but several? After all, WGI “Competence,” ICRG “How
Well Governed,” BTI ”Outcomes,” and FSI ”Competence” are all identified similarly, as are
ICRG ”Lack of Tensions and Conflict” and FSI ”Group Differences and Tensions.” Could it
be that these factors are fundamental across state capability indexes? The following is an
attempt to determine the truly fundamental factors that drive state capability indexes.
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CHAPTER 7
Analysis: Identifying the Fundamental Factors of State Capability
Indexes
7.1 Preparing the Data for This Analysis
To permit an analysis of the factors driving the commonalities of the four state capability
indexes, I merged their information and examined those observations (of a particular country
in a particular year) that were assigned values by each index. This sample is subsequently
referred to as “All Indexes”1 Unfortunately, the resulting number of indicators (46) was too
great for CFA to be run on a random half of the resulting sample (which would only be 203
observations) for it to be identified, or the results of EFA to have much power. For this
1Because the countries received high values on the indicators of the FSI for poor outcomes, I subtracted
the values of these indicators from 10 to produce new indicators whose measurement scale aligns with the
indicators of the other index. I thus also flip the identification of the fundamental factors of the FSI - “Group
Differences and Tensions” becomes “Absence of Group Differences and Tensions*” and “Lack of Competence”
becomes “Competence*.”
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reason, I conducted EFA on all of the observations of “All Indexes,” but not CFA. This
procedure maximizes the likelihood of the validity of my results; EFA is required, not CFA,
to reveal the unknown dynamics of a data set, and examining all of the observations of the
data set provides me with a big enough sample to prevent nonnormality from warping EFA’s
approximation of the fundamental factors of the data set (Fabrigar 1999).
Of course, there is a chance that spurious discrepancies from the commonalities that
are implied by the true fundamental factors may be so prevalent in the data set that EFA is
tricked into approximating these spurious deviations rather than strictly the true
fundamental factors. But each model produced by EFA in Chapter 5 was consistent, per
CFA, across randomized samples of data sets2. Consistency of the model produced by EFA
on “All Indexes” with the models that were produced by EFA and verified by CFA for each
particular index therefore would suggest the ability of my model of “All Indexes” to actually
represent the fundamental structure of “All Indexes.” I thus conduct EFA on all
observations of “All Indexes” and test its consistency with the previously verified models.
7.2 Determining the Number of Fundamental Factors
of State Capability Indexes
Table A.6 displays the eigenvalues of the first ten initially extracted factors. Since the first
four factors have eigenvalues greater than 1, Kaiser’s criterion suggests that four factors
drive the commonalities of “All Indexes.” The scree plot of the eigenvalues of Table A.6,
displayed in Figure B.6, corroborates this hypothesis; there appears to be a difference
between the eigenvalue of the fourth extracted factor and that of the fifth extracted factor,
2This itself is a heartening suggestion of the rigor of my EFA procedure alone to determine the fundamental
structure of a data set.
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but there appears to be very little difference between the eigenvalue of the fifth extracted
factor and that of all subsequent extracted factors.
Analysis of the pairwise correlation residuals of the predicted correlation matrix
generated by EFA’s best approximation of an alternative number of fundamental factors
verifies the suggested number of forces driving the commonalities of “All Indexes.” While
16.04% (166/1035) of these residuals using the first three extracted factors are greater than
0.05, (with 29 of them greater than 0.1 and the maximum residual as large as 0.1898), a
much lower percentage (7.53%, 78/1035) of these residuals using the rotated first four
extracted factors are greater than 0.05 (with only 8 of them greater than 0.1 and maximum
residual 0.1564). It indeed appears that four forces drive the commonalities of “All Indexes.”
These forces are represented by the rotated first four extracted factors, and the loadings of
these forces on each indicator of “All Indexes” are presented in Table A.22.
7.3 Identifying the Fundamental Factors of State
Capability Indexes
To characterize the forces that drive the communalities of “All Indexes,” I have displayed the
indicators and their definitions in order of their loadings by the first rotated factor in Table
A.17, by the second rotated factor in Table A.18, by the third rotated factor in Table A.19,
and by the fourth rotated factor in Table A.20. As shown by Table A.17, the first force loads
heavily on 26 indicators, and these loadings are substantially greater than the loadings of
this force on the other indicators - the 26th largest loading of the first force on an indicator is
0.3351, while the 27th largest loading of the first force on an indicator is only 0.2537 It
appears that the first force drives the communalities of these 26 indicators.
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As shown by Table A.18, the second force loads heavily on 17 indicators, and these
loadings are substantially greater than the loadings of this force on the other indicators - the
17th largest loading of the second force on an indicator is 0.3840 while the 18th largest
loading of the second force on an indicator is only 0.2964. It appears that the second force
drives the communalities of these 17 indicators.
As shown by Table A.19, the third force loads heavily on nine indicators, and these
loadings are substantially greater than the loadings of this force on the other indicators - the
ninth largest loading of the third force on an indicator is 0.4797, while the tenth largest
loading of the third force on an indicator is only 0.3140. It appears that the third force
drives the communalities of these nine indicators.
As shown by Table A.20, the fourth force loads heavily on four indicators, and these
loadings are greater than the loadings of this force on the other indicators - the fourth
largest loading of the fourth force on an indicator is 0.3484, while the fifth largest loading of
the fourth force on an indicator is 0.3027. It appears that the fourth force drives the
communalities of these four indicators.
The names of the indicators that are only driven by the first factor are displayed in
bold in Table A.17. Higher values of these 18 indicators are given to more effective
governments that are able to achieve better outcomes for their citizens. The fundamental
factor of these indicators thus seems to represent the effectiveness of governments, in the
sense that more effective governments use their greater competencies to be better able to
implement more sound policies that more substantially improve outcomes for their citizens. I
call this fundamental factor “Effectiveness.”
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The names of the indicators that are only driven by the second factor are displayed in
bold in Table A.18. Higher values of these 10 indicators are given to governments that are
more responsive to the wills of its citizens and more politically savvy. The fundamental
factor of these indicators thus seems to represent the political gumption of a government.
Governments with more political gumption are more spirited in their response to the
demands of its citizens and consequently muster greater political energy and resourcefulness
to satisfy these demands. I thus call this fundamental factor “Political Gumption.”
Six indicators are driven by the first and second factor. Their definitions are consistent
with my identification of these factors. In particular, each of these indicators measures the
quality of the support produced by the political system (factor 2) in order to produce better
outcomes for its citizens (factor 1).
The names of the indicators that are only driven by the third factor are displayed in
bold in Table A.19. Higher values of these seven indicators reflect fewer tensions, conflict,
and other pressures aﬄicting a country that spring from group dynamics within the country
itself. The fundamental factor of these indicators thus seems to represent the extent of
internal pressures in a country, in the sense that these pressures result from the tensions and
conflicts between groups of citizens. I call this fundamental factor “Absence of Internal
Tensions.”
One indicator is driven by the first and third factors - “Security Apparatus.” Its
definition is consistent with my identification of these fundamental forces. Indeed, “Security
Apparatus” measures how well the government is able to maintain its monopoly on the use
of force (factor 1) given power struggles between groups (factor 3).
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One indicator is driven by the second and third factors - “Factionalized Elites.” Its
definition is consistent with my identification of these fundamental forces. Indeed,
“Factionalized Elites” measures the extent to which different groups struggle (factor 3) in
political deadlock and brinksmanship for political gain at the expense of satisfying the will of
its citizens (factor 2).
The names of the indicators that are only driven by the fourth factor are displayed in
bold in Table A.20 Higher values of these two indicators reflect fewer pressures exerted on
the government from both external forces and disapproval of its citizens. The fundamental
factor of these indicators thus seems to represent the extent of pressures exterted on
governments that are not generated from internal group tensions. Without more definitions
to hone a more specific identification, however, I call this fundamental factor “Popular
Support and Absence of External Pressures.” Note that these two types of pressures are not
addressed by my identification of the third fundamental factor.
One indicator is driven by just the first and fourth factors - “Investment Profile.” Its
definition is consistent with my identification of these fundamental forces. In particular,
“Investment Profile” measures the extent to which investment outcomes (factor 1) are placed
at risk (factor 4).
One indicator is driven by the first, second and fourth factors - “Currency and Price
Stability.” Its definition is also consistent with my identification of these fundamental forces.
In particular, “Currency and Price Stability” measures the extent to which inflation,
exchange rates, and general macroeconomic outcomes (factor 1) are stabilized (factor 4) by
political precautions.
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Further, my identification of each fundamental force is not consistent with the
definitions of the indicators that I believe are not driven by this force.
The above analysis suggests the number, impact, and identity of the forces that drive
the commonalities of “All Indexes.”
7.4 Making Sense of the Fundamental Factors of
State Capability Indexes
7.4.1 Consistency of the Fundamental Factors of All State
Capability Indexes with the Fundamental Factors of Each
Particular Index
These four factors were produced as the best approximations of the factors that are
fundamental to all of the indicators of the WGI, ICRG, BTI, and FSI. Since they represent
the factors that are fundamental to the indicators of all indexes, they must also be
fundamental to the indicators of particular indexes. In this sense, the factors fundamental to
all indexes and the factors fundamental to each particular index must be consistent if I have
determined the true fundamental factors underlying all four of the state capability indexes.
7.4.1.1 Fundamental Factor 1: “Effectiveness”
The first fundamental factor to all indicators, “Effectiveness,” is overwhelmingly consistent
with the fundamental factors. Indeed, as demonstrated in Figure B.11, it overwhelmingly
drives similarly identified notions of WGI “Competence,” ICRG “Quality of Governance,”
BTI “Outcomes,” and FSI “Competence.”
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The second, third, and fourth fundamental factors to all indicators are also
overwhelmingly consistent with the identified notions that were thought to drive the
commonalities of each particular index. But their loadings on indicators also reveals
something important about these factors - each of these factors fundamental to all indicators
are able to differentiate an indicator from within particular indexes. Indeed, this is entirely
consistent with factor analysis; if “ Democratic Accountability” does not share common
patterns of variation and intercorrelation with the other indicators of the WGI, factor
analysis will be unable to tell that there is a fundamental factor of“Democratic
Accountability.” But analyzing the patterns of commonalities across all indicators places
together some of the indicators that are driven by the same fundamental factor and allows
them to show that they represent the same underlying notion. In this sense, slight
discrepancies in how the fundamental factors of all indicators seem to explain the factors
fundamental to particular indexes is actually quite intuitive. It is only when we combine
indexes may the truly fundamental factors be revealed.
7.5 Taking a Step Back
7.5.1 The Fundamental Forces that Produce State Capability
Outcomes
Each indicator is a manifestation of these fundamental factor. These indicators represent the
capability of states to deliver outcomes for their citizens, and so too do factors that drive
them represent the capability of states to deliver outcomes. Indeed, they suggest an
interesting story of how these fundamental elements of state capability interact to influence
how capable a state is to deliever outcomes to its citizens.
Factor analysis reveals there are four fundamental elements of a state’s capability to
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deliver outcomes for its citizens. I name these four elements (1) “Effectiveness;” (2)
“Political Gumption;” (3) “Absence of Internal Tensions;” and (4) “Popular Support and
Absence of External Pressures.” “Political Gumption” of a state represents the
responsiveness and political resourcefulness that a government musters to satisfy the
demands of its citizens. The outcomes that are actually delivered to its citizens are
determined by the state’s level of “Effectiveness” to implement its desires. Further, “Absence
of Internal Tensions and “Popular Support and Absence of External Pressures” represent the
amount of pressure exerted on the state that disrupt its ability to implement its desired level
of outcomes for its citizens. The indicators of the four studied state capability indexes are
manifestations of these fundamental elements.
7.5.2 Intuition of this Dynamic
As a further confirmation of the validity of my analysis to determine the fundamental
determinants of the capability of states to deliver outcomes for its citizens, the predicted
values of these fundamental determinants for states holds with intuition.
Singapore, widely accepted as the worlds most effective state, indeed receives the
highest score for “Effectiveness.” Somalia, which is essentially not a state that is virtually
unable to implement any of its desires, receives the lowest score for “Effectiveness.” North
Korea, a repressive dictatorship, receives the lowest score for “Political Gumption.” Pakistan
and Sudan, both routed by severe internal conflict, receive the lowest scores for Absence of
Internal Pressures. Venezuela, buffeted by high inflation, volatile oil prices, and increasing
popular unrest, receives the lowest score for “Absence of External Pressures.”
Nuances in the values of these predictions for particular countries further corroborate
the consistency of these factors relative to each other. Brazil, a regional champion of
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democracy, has a relatively much higher value for “Political Gumption” than the other
determinants. Nigeria, home to the terrorism of Boko Haram, receives an exceptionally low
value for “Absence of Internal Pressures.” Argentina, at the mercy of a crippling inflation
rate, receives an exceptionally low value for Popular Support and Absence of External
Pressures, despite receiving substantially higher values for the other fundamental
determinants.
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CHAPTER 8
Discussion
In the first valid investigation of what state capability indexes actually measure, I have
determined that there are four fundamental elements of how capable a state is to deliver
outcomes for its citizens. These fundamental elements combined to represent the forces that
drove the variation of each particular index. Since these indexes were studied for their
distinctions, it is likely that this conclusion generalizes to all other indexes of state capability.
This is fascinating; despite the attempts of experts to pick apart many distinct aspects
of institutions, there are only four fundamental forces that determine the capabilities of a
nation. This reduces the incredibly vauge and fuzzy definitions of institutions into concrete
fundamental notions that can be readily understood and more easily measured. By
identifying these fundamental elements of state capability, it is now possible to develop
causal mechanisms that explain their determinants, and thus the determinants of outcomes
across the world.
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APPENDIX A
Tables
Table A.1: Definitions of the Indicators of the Worldwide Governance Indicators
Indicator Definition
Control of Corruption
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ”capture” of the state by elites and
private interests.
Government
Effectiveness
Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil serivce and the
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.
Political Stability
and Absence of
Violence/Terrorism
Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown
by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.
Regulatory Quality Reflects Perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
Rule of Law
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police,
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Voice and
Accountability
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a
free media.
These are the definitions of the indicators of the Worldwide Governace Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2013).
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Table A.2: Definitions of the Indicators of the International Country Risk Guide
Indicator Definition
Bureaucracy Quality
Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is a shock absorber that tends to minimize
revisions of policy when governments change. In low-risk countries, the bureaucracy is somewhat
autonomous from political pressure.
Corruption
A measure of corruption within the political system that is a threat to foreign investment by
distorting the economic and financial environment, reducing the efficiency of government and
business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability,
and introducing inherent instability into the political process.
Democratic
Accountability
A measure of, not just whether there are free and fair elections, but how responsive government is
to its people. The less responsive it is, the more likely it will fall. Even democratically elected
governments can delude themselves into thinking they know what is best for the people, regardless
of clear indications to the contrary from the people.
Ethnic Tensions
A measure of the degree of tension attributable to racial, national, or language divisions. Lower
ratings (higher risk) are given to countries where tensions are high because opposing groups are
intolerant and unwilling to compromise.
External Conflict
A measure of both the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from non-
violent external pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, territorial
disputes, sanctions, etc) to violent external pressure (cross-border conflicts to all-out war). The
risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: War, Cross-Border Conflict, and Foreign
Pressures.
Government Stability
A measure of both of the governments ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its ability
to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: Government Unity,
Legislative Strength, and Popular Support.
Internal Conflict
A measure of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance. The
risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: Civil War/Coup Threat, Terrorism/Political
Violence, and Civil Disorder.
Investment Profile
A measure of the factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other political,
economic and financial risk components. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents:
Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits Repatriation, and Payment Delays.
Law and Order
Two measures comprising one risk component. Each sub-component equals half of the total. The
”law” sub-component assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the ”order”
sub-component assesses popular observance of the law.
Military in Politics
A measure of the military’s involvement in politics. Since the military is not elected, involvement,
even at a peripheral level, diminishes democratic accountability. Military involvement might stem
from an external or internal threat, be symptomatic of underlying difficulties, or be a full-scale
military takeover. Over the long term, a system of military government will almost certainly
diminish effective governmental functioning, become corrupt, and create an uneasy environment
for foreign businesses.
Religious Tensions
A measure of religious tensions arising from the domination of society and/or governance by a
single religious group – or a desire to dominate – in a way that replaces civil law by religious
law, excludes other religions from the political/social processes, suppresses religious freedom or
expressions of religious identity. The risks involved range from inexperienced people imposing
inappropriate policies to civil dissent or civil war.
Socioeconomic
Conditions
A measure of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could constrain government
action or fuel social dissatisfaction. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents:
Unemployment, Consumer Confidence, and Poverty.
These are the definitions of the indicators of the International Country Risk Guide (The Political Risk Services Group 2014b).
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Table A.3: Definitions of the Indicators of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index
Indicator Sub-Index Definition
Stateness Political
There is clarity about the nations existence as a state with adequately estab-
lished and differentiated power structures.
Political Participation Political The populace decides who rules, and it has other political freedoms.
Rule of Law Political State powers check and balance one another and ensure civil rights.
Stability of Democratic
Institutions
Political
Democratic institutions are capable of performing, and they are adequately
accepted.
Political and Social
Integration
Political
Stable patterns of representation exist for mediating between society and the
state; there is also a consolidated civic structure.
Level of Socioeconomic
Development
Economic
In principle, the country’s level of development permits adequate freedom of
choice for all citizens.
Organization of the Market
and Competition
Economic There are clear rules for stable, market-based competition.
Currency and Price
Stability
Economic
There are institutional or political precautions to control inflation sustainably,
together with an appropriate monetary policy and fiscal policy.
Private Property Economic There are adequate conditions to support a functional private sector.
Welfare Regime Economic There are viable arrangements to compensate for social risks.
Economic Perfomance Economic The economy’s performance points to solid development.
Sustainability Economic Economic growth is balanced, environmentally sustainable and future-oriented.
Steering Capability Management The government manages reforms effectively and can acheive its policy priorities.
Resource Efficiency Management The government makes optimum use of available resources.
Consensus-Building Management
The political leadership establishes a broad consensus on reform with other
actors in society without sacrificing its reform goals.
International Cooperation Management
The political leadership is willing and able to cooperate with external supporters
and organizations.
These are the definitions of the indicators of the Bertlesmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (Bertlesmann Stiftung 2014c).
See Table A.4 for a listing of the questions that were assigned to determine the values of each of these indicators.
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Table A.4: The Information Revealed by the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index
Indicator Questions
Stateness
To what extent does the states monopoly on the use of force cover the entire territory of the country? To what extent do all
relevant groups in society agree about citizenship and accept the nation-state as legitimate? To what extent are legal order and
political institutions defined without interference by religious dogmas? To what extent do basic administrative structures exist?
Political
Participation
To what extent are political representatives determined by general, free and fair elections? To what extent do democratically
elected political representatives have the effective power to govern, or to what extent are there veto powers and political
enclaves? To what extent can individuals form and join independent political or civic groups? To what extent can these groups
operate and assemble freely? To what extent can citizens, organizations and the mass media express opinions freely?
Rule of Law
To what extent is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances)? To what extent does an independent judiciary
exist? To what extent are public officeholders who abuse their positions prosecuted or penalized? To what extent are civil
rights guaranteed and protected, and to what extent can citizens seek redress for violations of these rights?
Stability of
Democratic
Institutions
Are democratic institutions capable of performing? To what extent are democratic institutions accepted as legitimate by the
relevant actors?
Political and
Social
Integration
To what extent is there a stable and socially rooted party system able to articulate and aggregate societal interests? To what
extent is there a network of cooperative associations or interest groups to mediate between society and the political system?
How strong is the citizens approval of democratic norms and procedures? To what extent have social self-organization and the
construction of social capital advanced?
Level of
Socioeconomic
Development
To what extent are significant parts of the population fundamentally excluded from society due to poverty and inequality?
Organization of
the Market
and Competition
To what level have the fundamentals of market-based competition developed? To what extent do safeguards exist to prevent
the development of economic monopolies and cartels, and to what extent are they enforced? To what extent has foreign trade
been liberalized? To what extent have a solid banking system and a functioning capital market been established?
Currency and
Price
Stability
To what extent do government and central bank pursue a consistent inflation policy and an appropriate foreign exchange
policy? To what extent do the governments fiscal and debt policies support macroeconomic stability?
Private Property
To what extent do government authorities ensure well-defined rights of private property and regulate the acquisition, benefits,
use and sale of property? To what extent are private companies permitted and protected? Are privatization processes conducted
in a manner consistent with market principles?
Welfare Regime To what extent do social safety nets provide compensation for social risks? To what extent does equality of opportunity exist?
Economic
Perfomance
How does the economy, as measured in quantitative indicators, perform?
Sustainability
To what extent are environmental concerns effectively taken into account in both macro and microeconomic terms? To what
extent are there solid institutions for basic, secondary and tertiary education, as well as for research and development?
Steering
Capability
To what extent does the government set and maintain strategic priorities? How effective is the government in implementing its
own policies? How innovative and flexible is the government?
Resource
Efficiency
To what extent does the government make efficient use of available human, financial and organizational resources? To what
extent can the government coordinate conflicting objectives into a coherent policy? To what extent does the government
successfully contain corruption?
Consensus-
Building
To what extent do the major political actors agree on democracy and a market economy as strategic, long-term goals? To what
extent can reformers exclude or co-opt anti-democratic actors? To what extent is the political leadership able to moderate
cleavage-based conflict? To what extent does the political leadership enable the participation of civil society in the political
process? To what extent can the political leadership bring about reconciliation between the victims and perpetrators of past
injustices?
International
Cooperation
To what extent does the political leadership use the support of international partners to implement a long-term strategy of
development? To what extent does the government act as a credible and reliable partner in its relations with the international
community? To what extent is the political leadership willing and able to cooperate with neighboring countries?
The score a country receives on a particular indicator of the Bertlesmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index is developed to directly answer the corresponding
questions (Bertlesmann Stiftung 2014c.
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Table A.5: Definitions of the Fragile State Index
Indicator Indicator Class Definition
Demographic
Pressures
Social
Pressures on the population such as disease and natural disasters make it
difficult for the government to protect its citizens or demonstrate a lack of
capacity or will.
Group Grievance Social
When tension and violence exist between groups, the state’s ability to provide
security is undermined and fear and further violence may ensue.
Human Flight
and Brain Drain
Social
When there is little opportunity, people migrate, leaving a vacuum of human
capital. Those with resources also oten leave before, or just as, conflict erupts.
Refugees and
IDPs
Social
Pressures associated with population displacement. These strain public sercices
and have the potential to pose a security threat.
Poverty and
Economic Decline
Economic
Poverty and economic decline strain the ability of the state to provide for its
citizens if they cannot provide for themselves and can create friction between
the “haves” and the “have nots.”
Uneven Economic
Development
Economic
When there are ethnic, religious, or regional disparities, the governed tend to
be uneven in their commitment to the social contract.
External
Intervention
Political and Military
When the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligation, external
actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate internal affairs.
Factionalized
Elites
Political and Military
When local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinksmanship for
political gain, this undermines the social contract.
Human Rights
and Rule of Law
Political and Military
When human rights are violated or unevenly protected, the state is failing in
its ultimate responsibility.
Public Services Poliitcal and Military
The provision of health, education, and sanitation services, among others, are
key roles of the state.
Security
Apparatus
Political and Military
The security apparatus should have a monopoly on the use of legitimate force.
The social contract is weakned where this is affected by competing groups.
State Legitimacy Political and Military
Corruption and a lack of representatives in the government directly undermine
the social contract.
These are the definitions of the indicators of the FSI (The Fund for Peace 2014a).
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Table A.6: Eigenvalues from Each Initial EFA
WGI ICRG BTI FSI All
Eigenvalue Eigenvalue Eigenvalue Eigenvalue Eigenvalue
Factor 1 4.87344 Factor 1 5.30221 Factor 1 11.76590 Factor 1 9.11163 Factor 1 26.62249
Factor 2 0.16647 Factor 2 0.82149 Factor 2 1.36921 Factor 2 0.54524 Factor 2 4.68747
Factor 3 0.03293 Factor 3 0.69957 Factor 3 0.62611 Factor 3 0.27545 Factor 3 2.39943
Factor 4 -0.03038 Factor 4 0.25976 Factor 4 0.27301 Factor 4 0.16059 Factor 4 1.42644
Factor 5 -0.03673 Factor 5 0.10152 Factor 5 0.09547 Factor 5 0.11854 Factor 5 0.81646
Factor 6 -0.06605 Factor 6 0.10152 Factor 6 0.02872 Factor 6 0.00884 Factor 6 0.59916
Factor 7 -0.02033 Factor 7 -0.00089 Factor 7 -0.00220 Factor 7 0.54351
Factor 8 -0.09174 Factor 8 -0.00324 Factor 8 -0.03059 Factor 8 0.52534
Factor 9 -0.10905 Factor 9 -0.01417 Factor 9 -0.04750 Factor 9 0.39186
Factor 10 -0.13150 Factor 10 -0.02156 Factor 10 -0.05404 Factor 10 0.34381
Factor 11 -0.14123 Factor 11 -0.02395 Factor 11 -0.07003
Factor 12 -0.23515 Factor 12 -0.02660 Factor 12 -0.09033
Factor 13 -0.03611
Factor 14 -0.04174
Factor 15 -0.04815
Factor 16 -0.08909
N 1609 N 2183 N 373 N 785 N 406
The second, fourth, sixth, and eighth columns display the eigenvalues of the factors extracted by applying EFA on the indicators of
each index of the first randomized group of countries. The tenth column displays the eigenvalues of the factors extracted by
applying EFA on all of the indicators of all four indexes of the observations that had values for each of these indicators.
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Table A.7: Loadings of First Factor Extracted by Initial EFA of the WGI and FSI
WGI
Indicator Factor 1
Control of Corruption 0.9555
Government Effectiveness 0.9605
Political Stability and Absence of
Violence / Terrorism
0.7637
Regulatory Quality 0.9257
Rule of Law 0.9729
Voice and Accountability 0.8068
(a) These are the loadings on observed vari-
ables of the first factor extracted by EFA for
the first group of randomized countries of the
WGI.
FSI
Indicator Factor 1
Demographic Pressures 0.9061
Refugees and IDPs 0.7614
Group
Grievance
0.8395
Human Flight and Brain Drain 0.8162
Uneven Economic Development 0.8645
Poverty and Economic Decline 0.8279
State Legitimacy 0.9236
Public Services 0.9126
Human Rights 0.8939
Security Apparatus 0.9285
Factionalized Elites 0.9002
External Intervention 0.8657
(b) These are the loadings on observed vari-
ables of the first factor extracted by EFA for
the first group of randomized countries of the
FSI.
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Table A.8: Ordered Factor Loadings on the First Force Driving the WGI
Indicator Loading Definition
Government
Effectiveness
0.8727
Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality
of the civil serivce and the degree of its independence from political
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation,
and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.
Regulatory Quality 0.8672
Reflects Perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and
promote private sector development.
Control of Corruption2 0.6355
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is ex-
ercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as ”capture” of the state by elites and private inter-
ests.
Rule of Law2 0.5422
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well
as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Voice and
Accountability
0.3265
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression,
freedom of association, and a free media.
Political Stability
and Absence of
Violence/Terrorism
0.1108
Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be desta-
bilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including
politically-motivated violence and terrorism.
These are the ordered loadings on the first force driving the WGI.
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Table A.9: Ordered Factor Loadings on the Second Force Driving the WGI
Indicator Loading Definition
Political Stability
and Absence of
Violence/Terrorism
0.7225
Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means,
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.
Voice and
Accountability
0.5418
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are
able to participate in selecting their government, as well as free-
dom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
Rule of Law1 0.4941
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well
as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Control of Corruption1 0.3785
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as
well as ”capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
Government
Effectiveness
0.1330
Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the
civil serivce and the degree of its independence from political pressures,
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility
of the government’s commitment to such policies.
Regulatory Quality 0.1005
Reflects Perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote
private sector development.
These are the ordered loadings on the second force driving the WGI.
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Table A.10: Ordered Factor Loadings on the First Force Driving the ICRG
Indicator Loading Definition
Bureaucracy
Quality
0.9027
Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is a shock absorber that
tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. In low-risk countries, the
bureaucracy is somewhat autonomous from political pressure.
Corruption 0.7418
A measure of corruption within the political system that is a threat to foreign
investment by distorting the economic and financial environment, reducing the efficiency
of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through
patronage rather than ability, and introducing inherent instability into the political
process.
Socioeconomic
Conditions
0.6871
A measure of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could constrain
government action or fuel social dissatisfaction. The risk rating assigned is the sum of
three subcomponents: Unemployment, Consumer Confidence, and Poverty.
Military in
Politics
0.5678
A measure of the military’s involvement in politics. Since the military is not elected,
involvement, even at a peripheral level, diminishes democratic accountability. Military
involvement might stem from an external or internal threat, be symptomatic of underlying
difficulties, or be a full-scale military takeover. Over the long term, a system of military
government will almost certainly diminish effective governmental functioning,
become corrupt, and create an uneasy environment for foreign businesses.
Law and Order 0.5402
Two measures comprising one risk component. Each sub-component equals half of the
total. The ”law” sub-component assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal
system, and the ”order” sub-component assesses popular observance of the law.
Democratic
Accountability
0.5321
A measure of, not just whether there are free and fair elections, but how responsive
government is to its people. The less responsive it is, the more likely it will fall. Even
democratically elected governments can delude themselves into thinking they know what is
best for the people, regardless of clear indications to the contrary from the people.
Investment
Profile
0.2645
A measure of the factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other
political, economic and financial risk components. The risk rating assigned is the sum
of three subcomponents: Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits Repatriation, and
Payment Delays.
Religious
Tensions
0.1417
A measure of religious tensions arising from the domination of society and/or governance
by a single religious group – or a desire to dominate – in a way that replaces civil law by
religious law, excludes other religions from the political/social processes, suppresses religious
freedom or expressions of religious identity. The risks involved range from inexperienced
people imposing inappropriate policies to civil dissent or civil war.
Internal Conflict 0.0725
A measure of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on
governance. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: Civil War/Coup
Threat, Terrorism/Political Violence, and Civil Disorder.
Ethnic Tensions −0.0107
A measure of the degree of tension attributable to racial, national, or language divisions.
Lower ratings (higher risk) are given to countries where tensions are high because opposing
groups are intolerant and unwilling to compromise.
External Conflict −0.0250
A measure of both the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from
non-violent external pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions,
territorial disputes, sanctions, etc) to violent external pressure (cross-border conflicts to all-
out war). The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: War, Cross-Border
Conflict, and Foreign Pressures.
Government
Stability
−0.1675
A measure of both of the governments ability to carry out its declared program(s), and
its ability to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents:
Government Unity, Legislative Strength, and Popular Support.
These are the ordered loadings on the first force driving the ICRG.
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Table A.11: Ordered Factor Loadings on the Second Force Driving the ICRG
Indicator Loading Definition
Internal
Conflict
0.7030
A measure of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on
governance. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: Civil War/Coup
Threat, Terrorism/Political Violence, and Civil Disorder.
External
Conflict
0.6439
A measure of both the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action,
ranging from non-violent external pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade
restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, etc) to violent external pressure (cross-border
conflicts to all-out war). The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: War,
Cross-Border Conflict, and Foreign Pressures.
Ethnic
Tensions
0.6072
A measure of the degree of tension attributable to racial, national, or language
divisions. Lower ratings (higher risk) are given to countries where tensions are high
because opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to compromise.
Religious
Tensions
0.5367
A measure of religious tensions arising from the domination of society and/or
governance by a single religious group – or a desire to dominate – in a way that
replaces civil law by religious law, excludes other religions from the political/social
processes, suppresses religious freedom or expressions of religious identity. The risks
involved range from inexperienced people imposing inappropriate policies to civil dissent
or civil war.
Military in
Politics
0.3245
A measure of the military’s involvement in politics. Since the military is not elected,
involvement, even at a peripheral level, diminishes democratic accountability. Military
involvement might stem from an external or internal threat, be symptomatic of underlying
difficulties, or be a full-scale military takeover. Over the long term, a system of military
government will almost certainly diminish effective governmental functioning, become
corrupt, and create an uneasy environment for foreign businesses.
Democratic
Accountability
0.2914
A measure of, not just whether there are free and fair elections, but how responsive
government is to its people. The less responsive it is, the more likely it will fall. Even
democratically elected governments can delude themselves into thinking they know what is
best for the people, regardless of clear indications to the contrary from the people.
Law and Order 0.2750
Two measures comprising one risk component. Each sub-component equals half of the
total. The ”law” sub-component assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system,
and the ”order” sub-component assesses popular observance of the law.
Corruption 0.1659
A measure of corruption within the political system that is a threat to foreign investment
by distorting the economic and financial environment, reducing the efficiency of government
and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather
than ability, and introducing inherent instability into the political process.
Government
Stability
0.0842
A measure of both of the governments ability to carry out its declared program(s), and
its ability to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents:
Government Unity, Legislative Strength, and Popular Support.
Investment
Profile
−0.0408
A measure of the factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other
political, economic and financial risk components. The risk rating assigned is the sum
of three subcomponents: Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits Repatriation, and
Payment Delays.
Bureaucracy
Quality
−0.0896
Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is a shock absorber that tends
to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. In low-risk countries, the
bureaucracy is somewhat autonomous from political pressure.
Socioeconomic
Conditions
−0.1542
A measure of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could constrain gov-
ernment action or fuel social dissatisfaction. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three
subcomponents: Unemployment, Consumer Confidence, and Poverty.
These are the ordered loadings on the second force driving the ICRG.
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Table A.12: Ordered Factor Loadings on the Third Force Driving the ICRG
Indicator Loading Definition
Government
Stability
0.6673
A measure of both of the governments ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its
ability to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents:
Government Unity, Legislative Strength, and Popular Support.
Investment
Profile
0.6515
A measure of the factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other
political, economic and financial risk components. The risk rating assigned is the sum
of three subcomponents: Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits Repatriation,
and Payment Delays.
Socioeconomic
Conditions
0.2901
A measure of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could constrain gov-
ernment action or fuel social dissatisfaction. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three
subcomponents: Unemployment, Consumer Confidence, and Poverty.
Internal Conflict 0.2374
A measure of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on
governance. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: Civil War/Coup
Threat, Terrorism/Political Violence, and Civil Disorder.
Law and Order 0.1830
Two measures comprising one risk component. Each sub-component equals half of the
total. The ”law” sub-component assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system,
and the ”order” sub-component assesses popular observance of the law.
Ethnic Tensions 0.1243
A measure of the degree of tension attributable to racial, national, or language divisions.
Lower ratings (higher risk) are given to countries where tensions are high because opposing
groups are intolerant and unwilling to compromise.
External Conflict 0.1106
A measure of both the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from
non-violent external pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions,
territorial disputes, sanctions, etc) to violent external pressure (cross-border conflicts to all-
out war). The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: War, Cross-Border
Conflict, and Foreign Pressures.
Bureaucracy
Quality
0.0513
Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is a shock absorber that tends
to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. In low-risk countries, the
bureaucracy is somewhat autonomous from political pressure.
Military in
Politics
0.0449
A measure of the military’s involvement in politics. Since the military is not elected,
involvement, even at a peripheral level, diminishes democratic accountability. Military
involvement might stem from an external or internal threat, be symptomatic of underlying
difficulties, or be a full-scale military takeover. Over the long term, a system of military
government will almost certainly diminish effective governmental functioning, become
corrupt, and create an uneasy environment for foreign businesses.
Democratic
Accountability
−0.1518
A measure of, not just whether there are free and fair elections, but how responsive
government is to its people. The less responsive it is, the more likely it will fall. Even
democratically elected governments can delude themselves into thinking they know what is
best for the people, regardless of clear indications to the contrary from the people.
Religious
Tensions
−0.1798
A measure of religious tensions arising from the domination of society and/or governance
by a single religious group – or a desire to dominate – in a way that replaces civil law by
religious law, excludes other religions from the political/social processes, suppresses religious
freedom or expressions of religious identity. The risks involved range from inexperienced
people imposing inappropriate policies to civil dissent or civil war.
Corruption −0.2274
A measure of corruption within the political system that is a threat to foreign investment
by distorting the economic and financial environment, reducing the efficiency of government
and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather
than ability, and introducing inherent instability into the political process.
These are the ordered loadings on the third force driving the ICRG.
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Table A.13: Ordered Factor Loadings on the First Force Driving the BTI
Indicator Loading Definition
Political Participation 1.0220 The populace decides who rules, and it has other political freedoms.
Stability of Democratic
Institutions
1.0002
Democratic institutions are capable of performing, and they are ade-
quately accepted.
Consensus-Building 0.9300
The political leadership establishes a broad consensus on reform with
other actors in society without sacrificing its reform goals.
Political and Social
Integration
0.8586
Stable patterns of representation exist for mediating between society
and the state; there is also a consolidated civic structure.
Rule of Law 0.8470 State powers check and balance one another and ensure civil rights.
International
Cooperation
0.8252
The political leadership is willing and able to cooperate with external
supporters and organizations.
Steering Capability 0.7581
The government manages reforms effectively and can acheive its policy
priorities.
Private Property2 0.6590 There are adequate conditions to support a functional private sector.
Currency and Price
Stability2
0.5757
There are institutional or political precautions to control inflation
sustainably, together with an appropriate monetary policy and fiscal
policy.
Organization of the Market
and Competition2
0.5660 There are clear rules for stable, market-based competition.
Resource Efficiency2 0.5066 The government makes optimum use of available resources.
Economic Performance 0.1411 The economy’s performance points to solid development.
Sustainability 0.1286 Economic growth is balanced, environmentally sustainable and future-oriented.
Stateness 0.1052
There is clarity about the nations existence as a state with adequately estab-
lished and differentiated power structures.
Welfare Regime 0.0502 There are viable arrangements to compensate for social risks.
Level of Socioeconomic
Development
−0.1314 In principle, the country’s level of development permits adequate freedom of
choice for all citizens.
These are the ordered loadings on the first force driving the BTI.
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Table A.14: Ordered Factor Loadings on the Second Force Driving the BTI
Indicator Loading Definition
Level of Socioeconomic
Development
0.9734
In principle, the country’s level of development permits adequate freedom
of choice for all citizens.
Welfare Regime 0.9085 There are viable arrangements to compensate for social risks.
Sustainability 0.8634
Economic growth is balanced, environmentally sustainable and future-
oriented.
Stateness 0.7207
There is clarity about the nations existence as a state with adequately estab-
lished and differentiated power structures.
Economic Performance 0.6484 The economy’s performance points to solid development.
Resource Efficiency1 0.5243 The government makes optimum use of available resources.
Organization of the Market
and Competition1
0.4392 There are clear rules for stable, market-based competition.
Currency and Price
Stability1
0.3411
There are institutional or political precautions to control inflation
sustainably, together with an appropriate monetary policy and fiscal policy.
Private Property1 0.3134 There are adequate conditions to support a functional private sector.
Steering Capability 0.2614 The government manages reforms effectively and can acheive its policy priorities.
Rule of Law 0.1502 State powers check and balance one another and ensure civil rights.
International Cooperation 0.0796
The political leadership is willing and able to cooperate with external supporters
and organizations.
Political and Social
Integration
0.0679
Stable patterns of representation exist for mediating between society and the
state; there is also a consolidated civic structure.
Consensus-Building 0.0510
The political leadership establishes a broad consensus on reform with other
actors in society without sacrificing its reform goals.
Stability of Democratic
Institutions
−0.0662 Democratic institutions are capable of performing, and they are adequately
accepted.
Political Participation −0.1304 The populace decides who rules, and it has other political freedoms.
These are the ordered loadings on the second force driving the BTI.
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Table A.15: Ordered Factor Loadings on the First Force Driving the FSI
Indicator Loading Definition
Factionalized Elites 0.8850
When local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinksmanship
for political gain, this undermines the social contract.
Group Grievance 0.8557
When tension and violence exist between groups, the state’s ability to
provide security is undermined and fear and further violence may ensue.
Human Rights and
Rule of Law
0.7733
When human rights are violated or unevenly protected, the state is
failing in its ultimate responsibility.
State Legitimacy 0.7506
Corruption and a lack of representatives in the government directly
undermine the social contract.
Security Apparatus 0.7025
The security apparatus should have a monopoly on the use of legitimate
force. The social contract is weakened where this is affected by competing
groups.
Refugees and IDPs 0.4760
Pressures associated with population displacement. These strain public
sercices and have the potential to pose a security threat.
Uneven Economic
Development2
0.4407
When there are ethnic, religious, or regional disparities, the governed
tend to be uneven in their commitment to the social contract.
External Intervention 0.3159
When the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligation, external
actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate internal affairs.
Human Flight and
Brain Drain
0.2387
When there is little opportunity, people migrate, leaving a vacuum of human
capital. Those with resources also oten leave before, or just as, conflict erupts.
Demographic Pressures 0.1380
Pressures on the population such as disease and natural disasters make it
difficult for the government to protect its citizens or demonstrate a lack of
capacity or will.
Public Services 0.1306
The provision of health, education, and sanitation services, among others, are
key roles of the state.
Poverty and Economic
Decline
0.0538
Poverty and economic decline strain the ability of the state to provide for its
citizens if they cannot provide for themselves and can create friction between
the “haves” and the “have nots.”
These are the ordered loadings on the first force driving the FSI.
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Table A.16: Ordered Factor Loadings on the Second Force Driving the FSI
Indicator Loading Definition
Public Services 0.8554
The provision of health, education, and sanitation services, among
others, are key roles of the state.
Poverty and
Economic
Decline
0.8413
Poverty and economic decline strain the ability of the state to provide
for its citizens if they cannot provide for themselves and can create friction
between the “haves” and the “have nots.”
Demographic
Pressures
0.8408
Pressures on the population such as disease and natural disasters make
it difficult for the government to protect its citizens or demonstrate
a lack of capacity or will.
Human Flight
and Brain
Drain
0.6418
When there is little opportunity, people migrate, leaving a vacuum of
human capital. Those with resources also oten leave before, or just as,
conflict erupts.
External
Intervention
0.6175
When the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligation,
external actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate internal
affairs.
Uneven Economic
Development1
0.4902
When there are ethnic, religious, or regional disparities, the governed tend
to be uneven in their commitment to the social contract.
Refugees and
IDPs
0.3431
Pressures associated with population displacement. These strain public sercices
and have the potential to pose a security threat.
Security
Apparatus
0.2951
The security apparatus should have a monopoly on the use of legitimate force.
The social contract is weakned where this is affected by competing groups.
State Legitimacy 0.2412
Corruption and a lack of representatives in the government directly undermine
the social contract.
Human Rights
and Rule of Law
0.1863
When human rights are violated or unevenly protected, the state is failing in
its ultimate responsibility.
Factionalized
Elites
0.0802
When local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinksmanship for
political gain, this undermines the social contract.
Group Grievance 0.0442
When tension and violence exist between groups, the state’s ability to provide
security is undermined and fear and further violence may ensue.
These are the ordered loadings on the second force driving the FSI.
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Table A.17: Ordered Factor Loadings on the First Force Driving “All Indexes”
Indicator Index Loading Definition
Public Services FSI 0.9864 The provision of health, education, and sanitation services, among others, are key roles of the state.
Level of
Socioeconomic
Development
BTI 0.9297 In principle, the country’s level of development permits adequate freedom of choice for all citizens.
Poverty and
Economic Decline
FSI 0.9143
Poverty and economic decline strain the ability of the state to provide for its citizens if they cannot provide for themselves
and can create friction between the “haves” and the “have nots.”
Socioeconomic
Conditions
ICRG 0.8966
A measure of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could constrain government action or fuel social
dissatisfaction. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: Unemployment, Consumer Confidence, and
Poverty.
Demographic
Pressures
FSI 0.8575
Pressures on the population such as disease and natural disasters make it difficult for the government to protect its
citizens or demonstrate a lack of capacity or will.
Government
Effectiveness
WGI 0.7995
Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil serivce and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to such policies.
Welfare Regime BTI 0.7896 There are viable arrangements to compensate for social risks.
Bureaucracy Quality ICRG 0.7507
Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is a shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when
governments change. In low-risk countries, the bureaucracy is somewhat autonomous from political pressure.
Sustainability BTI 0.7415 Economic growth is balanced, environmentally sustainable and future-oriented.
Human Flight and
Brain Drain
FSI 0.7320
When there is little opportunity, people migrate, leaving a vacuum of human capital. Those with resources also oten
leave before, or just as, conflict erupts.
Uneven Economic
Development
FSI 0.7223
When there are ethnic, religious, or regional disparities, the governed tend to be uneven in their commitment to the
social contract.
Rule of Law WGI 0.6801
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence.
Control of
Corruption
WGI 0.6306
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
Economic
Performance
BTI 0.5990 The economy’s performance points to solid development.
Law and Order ICRG 0.5877
Two measures comprising one risk component. Each sub-component equals half of the total. The “law” sub-component
assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system, and the ”order” sub-component assesses popular observance of
the law.
Regulatory Quality2 WGI 0.5488
Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that
permit and promote private sector development.
Resource Efficiency2 BTI 0.5071 The government makes optimum use of available resources.
Organization of the
Market and
Competition2
BTI 0.4971 There are clear rules for stable, market-based competition.
External Intervention FSI 0.4916
When the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligation, external actors may intervene to provide services or
to manipulate internal affairs.
Corruption ICRG 0.4599
A measure of corruption within the political system that is a threat to foreign investment by distorting the economic and
financial environment, reducing the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of
power through patronage rather than ability, and introducing inherent instability into the political process.
Private Property2 BTI 0.4562 There are adequate conditions to support a functional private sector.
Investment Profile4 ICRG 0.4531
A measure of the factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other political, economic and financial
risk components. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits
Repatriation, and Payment Delays.
Currency and Price
Stability2,4
BTI 0.3687
There are institutional or political precautions to control inflation sustainably, together with an appropriate monetary
policy and fiscal policy.
Security Apparatus3 FSI 0.3584
The security apparatus should have a monopoly on the use of legitimate force. The social contract is weakned where this
is affected by competing groups.
Legitimacy of the State2 FSI 0.3566 Corruption and a lack of representatives in the government directly undermine the social contract.
Military in Politics ICRG 0.3351
A measure of the military’s involvement in politics. Since the military is not elected, involvement, even at a peripheral
level, diminishes democratic accountability. Military involvement might stem from an external or internal threat, be
symptomatic of underlying difficulties, or be a full-scale military takeover. Over the long term, a system of military
government will almost certainly diminish effective governmental functioning, become corrupt, and create an uneasy
environment for foreign businesses.
Refugees and IDPs FSI 0.2537
Pressures associated with population displacement. These strain public sercices and have the potential to pose a security
threat.
These are the ordered loadings on the first force driving “All Indexes.” The indicators displayes with bolded names load heavily on this force.
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Table A.18: Ordered Factor Loadings on the Second Force Driving “All Indexes”
Indicator Index Loading Definition
Political
Participation
BTI 1.1083 The populace decides who rules, and it has other political freedoms.
Stability of
Democratic
Institutions
BTI 1.0685 Democratic institutions are capable of performing, and they are adequately accepted.
Political and Social
Integration
BTI 0.987
Stable patterns of representation exist for mediating between society and the state; there is also a consolidated civic
structure.
Voice and
Accountability
WGI 0.9692
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
Democratic
Accountability
ICRG 0.9496
A measure of, not just whether there are free and fair elections, but how responsive government is to its people. The less
responsive it is, the more likely it will fall. Even democratically elected governments can delude themselves into thinking
they know what is best for the people, regardless of clear indications to the contrary from the people.
Rule of Law BTI 0.9103 State powers check and balance one another and ensure civil rights.
Consensus-Building BTI 0.8984
The political leadership establishes a broad consensus on reform with other actors in society without sacrificing its reform
goals.
Steering Capability BTI 0.7865 The government manages reforms effectively and can acheive its policy priorities.
International
Cooperation
BTI 0.7443 The political leadership is willing and able to cooperate with external supporters and organizations.
Human Rights and
Rule of Law
FSI 0.6474 When human rights are violated or unevenly protected, the state is failing in its ultimate responsibility.
Private Property1 BTI 0.6222 There are adequate conditions to support a functional private sector.
Organization of the
Market and
Competition1
BTI 0.5926 There are clear rules for stable, market-based competition.
State Legitimacy1 FSI 0.4833 Corruption and a lack of representatives in the government directly undermine the social contract.
Currency and Price
Stability1,4
BTI 0.4622
There are institutional or political precautions to control inflation sustainably, together with an appropriate monetary
policy and fiscal policy.
Regulatory Quality1 WGI 0.4194
Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that
permit and promote private sector development.
Factionalized Elites3 FSI 0.3946
When local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinksmanship for political gain, this undermines the social
contract.
Resource Efficiency1 BTI 0.3840 The government makes optimum use of available resources.
Sustainability BTI 0.2964 Economic growth is balanced, environmentally sustainable and future-oriented.
These are the ordered loadings on the second force driving “All Indexes.” The indicators displayes with bolded names load heavily on this force.
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Table A.19: Ordered Factor Loadings on the Third Force Driving “All Indexes”
Indicator Index Loading Definition
Political Stability
and Absence of
Violence/Terrorism
WGI 0.7571
Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or
violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.
Internal Conflict ICRG 0.7542
A measure of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance. The risk rating assigned
is the sum of three subcomponents: Civil War/Coup Threat, Terrorism/Political Violence, and Civil Disorder.
Religious Tensions ICRG 0.7345
A measure of religious tensions arising from the domination of society and/or governance by a single religious group – or
a desire to dominate – in a way that replaces civil law by religious law, excludes other religions from the political/social
processes, suppresses religious freedom or expressions of religious identity. The risks involved range from inexperienced
people imposing inappropriate policies to civil dissent or civil war.
Group Grievance FSI 0.6869
When tension and violence exist between groups, the state’s ability to provide security is undermined and fear and
further violence may ensue.
Ethnic Tensions ICRG 0.6349
A measure of the degree of tension attributable to racial, national, or language divisions. Lower ratings (higher risk) are
given to countries where tensions are high because opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to compromise.
Stateness BTI 0.5903 There is clarity about the nations existence as a state with adequately established and differentiated power structures.
Refugees and IDPs FSI 0.5687
Pressures associated with population displacement. These strain public sercices and have the potential to pose a security
threat.
Factionalized Elites2 FSI 0.4870
When local and national leaders engage in deadlock and brinksmanship for political gain, this undermines the social
contract.
Security Apparatus1 FSI 0.4797
The security apparatus should have a monopoly on the use of legitimate force. The social contract is weakned where this
is affected by competing groups.
External Conflict ICRG 0.3140
A measure of both the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent external pressure
(diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, etc) to violent external
pressure (cross-border conflicts to all-out war). The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: War,
Cross-Border Conflict, and Foreign Pressures.
These are the ordered loadings on the third force driving “All Indexes.” The indicators displayes with bolded names load heavily on this force.
Table A.20: Ordered Factor Loadings on the Fourth Force Driving “All Indexes”
Indicator Index Loading Definition
Government
Stability
ICRG 0.5873
A measure of both of the governments ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office. The
risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: Government Unity, Legislative Strength, and Popular Support.
External Conflict ICRG 0.4917
A measure of both the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent external pressure
(diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, etc) to violent external
pressure (cross-border conflicts to all-out war). The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: War,
Cross-Border Conflict, and Foreign Pressures.
Investment Profile1 ICRG 0.4540
A measure of the factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other political, economic and financial
risk components. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents: Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits
Repatriation, and Payment Delays.
Currency and Price
Stability1,2
BTI 0.3484
There are institutional or political precautions to control inflation sustainably, together with an appropriate monetary
policy and fiscal policy.
Political Stability
and Absence of
Violence/Terrorism
WGI 0.3027
Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or
violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.
These are the ordered loadings on the fourth force driving “All Indexes.” The indicators displayes with bolded names load heavily on this force.
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Table A.21: Loadings of the Rotated Factors Determined by EFA on the Indicators of the
First Group of Randomized Countries of Each Index
WGI
Indicator Factor 1 Factor 2
Control of Corruption 0.6355 0.3785
Government Effectiveness 0.8727 0.1330
Political Stability
and Absence of
Violence / Terrorism
0.1108 0.7225
Regulatory Quality 0.8672 0.1005
Rule of Law 0.5442 0.4941
Voice and Accountability 0.3265 0.5418
BTI
Indicator Factor 1 Factor 2
Stateness 0.1052 0.7207
Political Participation 1.0220 -0.1304
Rule of Law 0.8470 0.1502
Stability of Democratic
Institutions
1.0002 -0.0662
Political and Social
Integration
0.8586 0.0679
Level of Socioeconomic
Development
-0.1314 0.9734
Organization of the
Market and Competition
0.5660 0.4392
Currency and Price
Stability
0.5757 0.3411
Private Property 0.6590 0.3134
Welfare Regime 0.0503 0.9085
Economic Performance 0.1411 0.6484
Sustainability 0.1286 0.8634
Steering Capability 0.7581 0.2614
Resource Efficiency 0.5066 0.5304
Consensus-Building 0.9300 0.0510
International Cooperation 0.8252 0.0796
ICRG
Indicator Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Bureaucracy Quality 0.9027 -0.0896 0.0513
Corruption 0.7418 0.1659 -0.2274
Democratic
Accountability
0.5321 0.2914 -0.1518
Ethnic Tensions -0.0107 0.6072 0.1243
External Conflict -0.0250 0.6439 0.1106
Government Stability -0.1675 0.0842 0.6673
Internal Conflict 0.0725 0.7030 0.2374
Investment Profile 0.2645 -0.0408 0.6515
Law and Order 0.5402 0.2750 0.1830
Military in Politics 0.5678 0.3245 0.0449
Religious Tensions 0.1417 0.5367 -0.1798
Socioeconomic Conditions 0.6871 -0.1542 0.2901
FSI
Indicator Factor 1 Factor 2
Demographic Pressures 0.1380 0.8408
Refugees and IDPs 0.4760 0.3431
Group Grievance 0.8557 0.0442
Human Flight and Brain
Drain
0.2387 0.6418
Uneven Economic
Development
0.4407 0.4902
Poverty and Economic
Decline
0.0538 0.8413
State Legitimacy 0.7506 0.2412
Public Services 0.1306 0.8554
Human Rights and Rule
of Law
0.7733 0.1863
Security Apparatus 0.7025 0.2951
Factionalized Elites 0.8850 0.0802
External Intervention 0.3159 0.6175
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Table A.22: Loadings of the Rotated Factors Determined by EFA on All of the Indicators
Indicators of the WGI
Indicator Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Control of Corruption 0.6306 0.1261 0.0833 0.2404
Government
Effectiveness
0.7995 0.1889 -0.0880 0.1748
Political Stability
and Absence of
Violence / Terrorism
0.1126 0.0093 0.7571 0.3027
Regulatory Quality 0.5488 0.4194 -0.1098 0.2598
Rule of Law 0.6801 0.1533 0.0221 0.2752
Voice and
Accountability
-0.0146 0.9692 0.0825 -0.0676
Indicators of the BTI
Indicator Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Stateness 0.2294 0.2212 0.5903 0.0296
Political Participation -0.2513 1.1083 0.0618 -0.1482
Rule of Law 0.1257 0.9103 0.0278 -0.0695
Stability of
Democratic
Institutions
-0.2277 1.0685 0.0899 -0.1220
Political and Social
Integration
-0.0031 0.9870 0.0122 -0.1679
Level of
Socioeconomic
Development
0.9297 0.0589 0.0768 -0.2425
Organization of the
Market
and Competition
0.4971 0.5926 -0.1214 0.0703
Currency and Price
Stability
0.3687 0.4622 -0.1310 0.3484
Private Property 0.4562 0.6222 -0.1463 0.0952
Welfare Regime 0.7896 0.1796 0.1412 -0.1586
Economic
Performance
0.5990 0.1302 -0.0760 0.2834
Sustainability 0.7415 0.2964 0.0690 -0.1312
Steering Capability 0.1231 0.7865 0.0321 0.1217
Resource Efficiency 0.5071 0.3840 0.0828 0.1754
Consensus-Building -0.0242 0.8984 0.1336 0.0368
International
Cooperation
0.0200 0.7443 0.0320 0.2957
Indicators of the ICRG
Indicator Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Bureaucracy
Quality
0.7507 0.2035 -0.1896 -0.0233
Corruption 0.4599 0.0864 -0.0011 0.3001
Democratic
Accountability
-0.0399 0.9496 -0.1347 -0.1448
Ethnic Tensions 0.1997 -0.2459 0.6349 0.0240
External Conflict -0.1321 0.2242 0.3140 0.4917
Government
Stability
-0.0620 -0.5158 0.2458 0.5873
Internal Conflict 0.0135 -0.0085 0.7542 0.2531
Investment Profile 0.4531 0.1377 -0.0831 0.4540
Law and Order 0.5877 -0.3906 0.2025 0.2118
Military in Politics 0.3351 0.2472 0.2683 0.1527
Religious Tensions -0.2307 0.1401 0.7345 -0.0046
Socioeconomic
Conditions
0.8966 -0.2163 0.0221 0.1190
Indicators of the FSI
Indicator Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Demographic
Pressures
0.8575 -0.0244 0.2229 -0.2518
Refugees and IDPs 0.2537 0.1354 0.5687 -0.0242
Group Grievance 0.1564 0.1678 0.6869 0.1288
Human Flight and
Brain Drain
0.7320 -0.3184 0.2477 0.0747
Uneven Economic
Development
0.7223 -0.0253 0.2723 -0.1613
Poverty and
Economic Decline
0.9143 -0.0508 -0.0941 -0.0181
State Legitimacy 0.3566 0.4833 0.2760 -0.0025
Public Services 0.9864 -0.0626 0.0970 -0.1704
Human Rights 0.2209 0.6474 0.2933 -0.0586
Security
Apparatus
0.3584 0.2593 0.4797 0.0411
Factionalized
Elites
0.1398 0.3946 0.4870 0.1355
External
Intervention
0.4916 0.0951 0.2889 0.0871
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Figures
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Figure B.1: Scree Plots of the Eigenvalues Produced by Applying EFA On The Indicators Of
A Particular State Capability Index
Figure B.2: The Hypothesized Model of Fundamental Factors of the WGI
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Figure B.3: The Hypothesized Model of Fundamental Factors of the ICRG
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Figure B.4: The Hypothesized Model of Fundamental Factors of the BTI
87
Figure B.5: The Hypothesized Model of Fundamental Factors of the FSI
88
Figure B.6: The Scree Plot of Eigenvalues Extracted from Initial EFA on All Indicators
Figure B.7: The Manifestation in the WGI of the Fundamental Elements of State Capability
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Figure B.8: The Manifestation in the ICRG of the Fundamental Elements of State Capability
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Figure B.9: The Manifestation in the BTI of the Fundamental Elements of State Capability
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Figure B.10: The Manifestation in the FSI of the Fundamental Elements of State Capability
92
Figure B.11: The Manifestation of the First Fundamental Element in Each State Capability
Index
93
Figure B.12: The Manifestation of the Second Fundamental Element in Each State Capability
Index
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Figure B.13: The Manifestation of the Third Fundamental Element in Each State Capability
Index
95
Figure B.14: The Manifestation of the Fourth Fundamental Element in Each State Capability
Index
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